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#### Vote negative to affirm a model of debate where the 1AC includes advocacy for a topical plan

#### USFG is the three branches

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>; RP]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Expand indicates change in law

Hatter 90 [Terry J Jr; March 20; January District Court Judge at the Central District of California; Westlaw, “In re Eastport Assocs.,” 114 B.R. 686]

Second, Eastport asserts that the presumption against retroactivity does not apply because the amendment was intended only as a clarification of existing law. Where an amendment to a statute is remedial in nature and merely serves to clarify existing law, no question of retroactivity is involved and the law will be applied to pending cases. City of Redlands v. Sorensen, 176 Cal.App.3d 202, 211, 221 Cal.Rptr. 728, 732 (1985). The evidence in this case, however, does not support the conclusion that the amendment to section 66452.6(f) was simply a clarification of preexisting law. The Legislative Counsel's Digest specifically states that “[t]he bill would expand the definition of development moratorium.” Senate Bill 186, Stats.1988, ch. 1330, at 3375 (emphasis added). Since the Legislative Counsel is a state official required by law to analyze pending legislation, it is reasonable to presume that the Legislature amended the statute with the intent and meaning expressed in the Counsel's digest. People v. Martinez, 194 Cal.App.3d 15, 22, 239 Cal.Rptr. 272, 276 (1987). By its ordinary meaning, the term “expand” indicates a change in the law, rather than a restatement of existing law. In light of the Counsel's comment, Eastport's argument is unpersuasive.

#### Scope means the law’s breadth

Parsons 14 [Honorable Donald F Jr; February 18; Vice Chancellor of the Court of Chancery of Delaware; Westlaw, “Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V.,” 85 A.3d 725]

As an initial matter, I reject the proposition that the determination of who can invoke a choice of law provision must precede the analysis of the provision's validity and scope. The “scope” of a choice of law provision refers to how broadly or narrowly that provision applies and includes the question of whether the provision created enforceable rights in third parties.310 The only case Philips N.V. cites in support of its assertion that Delaware law should govern whether it can invoke the choice of law clause merely stands for the proposition that a Delaware court will apply its own conflict of laws rules to determine which jurisdiction's substantive law will govern the claims before it.311 As noted previously, under Delaware conflict of laws rules, the scope of a valid choice of law provision is determined by the law of the selected jurisdiction—in this case, England.

#### Core antitrust laws are the Big Three

OECD ’8 [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; November 20; Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, “Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in the United States of America,” https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/2008-report/08annualrptoecd.pdf]

8. In April 2007, following three years of hearings and deliberations, the Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC) issued its Report and Recommendations. Among the principal conclusions of the AMC’s Report were the following:

* Free-market competition should remain the touchstone of United States economic policy.
* The core antitrust laws—Sherman Act sections 1 and 2, Clayton Act section 7, and FTC Act section 5—and their application by the courts and federal enforcement agencies are sound and appropriately safeguard the competitiveness of the U.S. economy.
* New or different rules are not needed for industries in which innovation, intellectual property, and technological change are central features. Unlike some other areas of the law, the core antitrust laws are general in nature and have been applied to many different industries to protect free-market competition successfully over a long period of time despite changes in the economy and the increasing pace of technological advancement. One of the great benefits of the Sherman and Clayton Acts is their adaptability to new economic conditions without sacrificing their ability to protect competition.

#### Departure from a predictable stasis undercuts the *political potential* of the activity

#### *participation* - opening the floodgates explodes *research burdens* and dramatically *skews win rates* - discourages involvement

#### *issue specialization* - there’s immense value in a narrowly-focused *progressive research community* that evaluates policies

Kevin J. Elliott 19, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Murray State University, 11/14/19, “Democracy's Pin Factory: Issue Specialization, the Division of Cognitive Labor, and Epistemic Performance,” American Journal of Political Science, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12486>

Consider the task facing citizens trying to make democratic decisions—that is, decisions about what policies to enact or who should have political power. This is conventionally understood to require citizens to consider and learn about every possible issue, figure out what the best policy is regarding each issue, and then trade off those policies against each other to construct an optimal political program (Beerbohm 2012). Then, in representative democracies, citizens must further consider which party or candidate most closely matches that program, bearing in mind that further trade‐offs are often necessary since none are likely to be a perfect match. This presents citizens with an immensely complex task, akin to an individual manufacturing, say, a modern car. But, like making a car, the difficulty of the task can be alleviated by breaking it up into smaller pieces, just as in Smith's pin factory. Democracy's pin factory, I argue, is found in breaking up and specializing the task of democratic choice through issue specialization and, to a lesser extent, by functional differentiation. Issue specialization is the first and most powerful element of this division of labor (Beerbohm 2012, 180–81; Elkins 1993).3 If we use a spatial metaphor and think of all the potential issues on the political agenda as occupying space on a landscape, then issue specialization operates by dividing that space into limited parcels corresponding to specific issues and having particular groups attend to each area. This vastly simplifies the task of coming to informed decisions (Lupia 2006, 227). Instead of becoming informed about every possible issue and trading off between them, members of each specialized group need only become informed about a single area and make their decisions on the merits of that issue. This specialization also allows members of these groups to develop a kind of issue expertise through surveillance of news and familiarity with the facts, organizations, and coalitions surrounding it.4 This is analogous to the dexterity Smith argues workers develop through the economic division of labor. In particular, specialized citizens are likely to have identified trustworthy groups or individuals from whom to take informational cues, reducing the costs of staying informed (Lupia 1994). This expertise enables them to do a better job than others at judging the performance or promises of candidates on that issue. Likewise, by concentrating on limited issue areas, citizens gain issue focus, which eliminates the costs of following every twist and turn of political events and learning about entirely new issues every few weeks. This is analogous to the elimination of changeover costs from one task to another highlighted by Smith. Issue focus also alleviates worries of activist fatigue arising from being pulled in several directions at once by a fragmented political agenda. Finally, by specializing and focusing, citizens are able to make maximally efficient use of the limited time, attention, and resources they can devote to politics, improving the “productivity” of their “citizenship time.” The complexity of the task is further simplified by another division of cognitive labor: functional differentiation. This is familiar in democratic theory and consists in dividing labor between individuals with different but complementary roles in a democratic system, in the way that the functions of representatives, activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens mutually complement each other (Christiano 2015; Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012). In this way, the task facing ordinary citizens is made even more tractable. Not only do they focus their attention on a limited share of the overall issue space, but they also share the burdens of surveilling and making decisions about that space with others fulfilling different roles. The two dimensions of divided labor work together, yet issue specialization is primary. We can see this by imagining the functional division of labor replicating itself within each of the specialized issue areas, as activists, journalists, and citizens specialize by issue, along with civil society. It may seem that functional differentiation is doing the work, but it must be remembered that it only comes into play on a field that has already been differentiated by issue. Issue specialization easily falls out of notice because it defines the ground over which first‐order political contestation occurs. It tends to disappear into the background because we take it for granted in any particular political debate. Though both kinds of division of labor are at work, the main source of epistemic merit is the topical division of labor that divides the decision task into limited parcels of issues. One question arising from the analogy between the economic and democratic division of labor is this: What mechanism aggregates the specialized work of these groups? In factories, aggregation happens spontaneously because the output of each specialized worker serves as input for the next step in production. But there is no obvious analogue among groups attending to different issues. In this account, the main agents of aggregation are representatives and political parties. As discussed below, in seeking election and building coalitions, these actors look to issue‐specialized groups for electoral support and for information about the sorts of policies they should advocate. Thus, aggregation mainly occurs through governing and competing to do so (e.g., constructing electoral platforms). If this account is correct, it creates a scalable advantage for mass publics over individuals and small groups because they cannot specialize in an analogous way. Individuals must decide using only the scarce attention and limited ability they individually possess. Small groups can, of course, specialize—there are, after all, Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, Education, and so on—but this specialization is severely limited by numbers and the broad diversity of issues. No matter how informed or sophisticated an individual or small group is, they will be importantly blinkered by their inherent cognitive limits. They can only admit a finite number of issues as important enough to command their direct attention. As a result, they will neglect many other important issues. A democratic public specialized by issue faces no such limits. Mass publics can be endlessly subdivided such that every issue has its specialists. Within this group of relative specialists, moreover, there is a further division of labor along the axis of functional complementarity, between ordinary citizens, activists, experts, and so forth. Democracy thereby reaps epistemic gains from specialization at a scale no individual or small group can match. One might ask what is specifically democratic about this mechanism since it might seem to be primarily about expertise and interest groups. The answer is that ordinary citizens—not just elites—are cultivating issue expertise and that it is the openness of democratic processes of aggregation and deliberation that mobilizes this distributed expertise, whereas nondemocratic or epistocratic institutions more closed to popular input cannot.

#### *progressivism* - engaging with *technocratic policy analysis* is key to convince students to confront *oppressive hierarchies*

Stannard ‘6 [Matt; Director of Forensics and Associate Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of Wyoming; April 18; “Deliberation, Debate, and Democracy in the Academy and Beyond,” http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html]

If it is indeed true that debate inevitably produces other-oriented deliberative discourse at the expense of students' confidence in their first-order convictions, this would indeed be a trade-off worth criticizing. In all fairness, Hicks and Greene do not overclaim their critique, and they take care to acknowledge the important ethical and cognitive virtues of deliberative debating. When represented as anything other than a political-ethical concern, however, Hicks and Greene's critique has several problems: First, as my colleague J.P. Lacy recently pointed out, it seems a tremendous causal (or even rhetorical) stretch to go from "debating both sides of an issue creates civic responsibility essential to liberal democracy" to "this civic responsibility upholds the worst forms of American exceptionalism." Second, Hicks and Greene do not make any comparison of the potentially bad power of debate to any alternative. Their implied alternative, however, is a form of forensic speech that privileges personal conviction. The idea that students should be able to preserve their personal convictions at all costs seems far more immediately tyrannical, far more immediately damaging to either liberal or participatory democracy, than the ritualized requirements that students occasionally take the opposite side of what they believe. Third, as I have suggested and will continue to suggest, while a debate project requiring participants to understand and often "speak for" opposing points of view may carry a great deal of liberal baggage, it is at its core a project more ethically deliberative than institutionally liberal. Where Hicks and Greene see debate producing "the liberal citizen-subject," I see debate at least having the potential to produce "the deliberative human being." The fact that some academic debaters are recruited by the CSIS and the CIA does not undermine this thesis. Absent healthy debate programs, these think-tanks and government agencies would still recruit what they saw as the best and brightest students. And absent a debate community that rewards anti-institutional political rhetoric as much as liberal rhetoric, those students would have little-to-no chance of being exposed to truly oppositional ideas. Moreover, if we allow ourselves to believe that it is "culturally imperialist" to help other peoples build institutions of debate and deliberation, we not only ignore living political struggles that occur in every culture, but we fall victim to a dangerous ethnocentrism in holding that "they do not value deliberation like we do." If the argument is that our participation in fostering debate communities abroad greases the wheels of globalization, the correct response, in debate terminology, is that such globalization is non-unique, inevitable, and there is only a risk that collaborating across cultures in public debate and deliberation will foster resistance to domination—just as debate accomplishes wherever it goes. Indeed, Andy Wallace, in a recent article, suggests that Islamic fundamentalism is a byproduct of the colonization of the lifeworld of the Middle East; if this is true, then one solution would be to foster cross-cultural deliberation among people on both sides of the cultural divide willing to question their own preconceptions of the social good. Hicks and Greene might be correct insofar as elites in various cultures can either forbid or reappropriate deliberation, but for those outside of that institutional power, democratic discussion would have a positively subversive effect.

We can read such criticisms in two ways. The first way is as a warning: That we ought to remain cautious of how academic debate will be represented and deployed outside of the academy, in the ruthless political realm, by those who use it to dodge truthful assertions, by underrepresented groups, of instances of material injustice. In this sense, the fear is one of a “legalistic” evasion of substantive injustice by those privileging procedure over substance, a trained style over the primordial truth of marginalized groups.

I prefer that interpretation to the second one: That the switch-side, research-driven “game” of debate is politically bankrupt and should give way to several simultaneous zones of speech activism, where speakers can and should only fight for their own beliefs. As Gordon Mitchell has pointed out, such balkanized speech will break down into several enclaves of speaking, each with its own political criteria for entry. In such a collection of impassable and unpermeable communities, those power relations, those material power entities, that evade political speech will remain unaccountable, will be given a “free pass” by the speech community, who will be so wrapped up in their own micropolitics, or so busy preaching to themselves and their choirs, that they will never understand or confront the rhetorical tropes used to mobilize both resources and true believers in the service of continued material domination. Habermas’s defense of the unfinished Enlightenment is my defense of academic debate: Don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. Instead, seek to expand this method of deliberation to those who will use it to liberate themselves, confront power, and create ethical, nonviolent patterns of problem resolution. If capitalism corrupts debate, well, then I say we save debate.

#### Empirical evidence confirms skills from policy debate contribute to influence in formulating government policy

O’Donnell ’10 [Timothy; Professor of Communication at University of Mary Washington, with a Ph.D. in communication, a M.A in communication and a B.A. in philosophy; October 14; “A Rationale for Intercollegiate Debate in the Twenty-first Century,” <https://www.americanforensicsassoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Navigating-Opportunity-Book.pdf>; JM]

Debate is a cross-disciplinary method of collaborative inquiry and intentional learning, focused on the controversial public policy issues of the day, emphasizing the fundamentals of argument—reasoning, research, communication, and practical judgment—through the clash of competing ideas and the habits of mind that come from understanding others’ arguments as well as one’s own. Although intercollegiate debate is a highly competitive activity, it is profitably viewed from a pedagogical perspective as a leadership laboratory designed to prepare the next generation for entry into the public sphere and the process of lifelong learning. From public administration to community activism, from personal decision making to government policy, and across a wide variety of fields from business to education, intercollegiate debate provides a liberal education that is the foundation of civic engagement. How does contemporary intercollegiate debate embody the values and goals of liberal education for a democratic society? At its core and from its earliest appearance in the American academy in the once wildly popular literary societies to its contemporary manifestation in national championship tournament competition, intercollegiate debate is a well-established and highly successful educational practice with substantial educational benefits for all students (O’Donnell 2008a). It is, in every sense, what George Kuh (2008) refers to as a “high-impact educational practice.” The literature review that follows seeks to ground this claim in a body of research. In so doing, it identifies the essential skills, virtues, and modes of inquiry that participation in debate fosters: critical thinking, leadership training, academic achievement, and ethics of advocacy, community building, active, intentional and cooperative learning, and empowerment.1 The literature selected for review focuses predominantly on research concerning intercollegiate debate. The body of work concerning classroom debating and other forms of noncompetitive debate have been intentionally excluded, although they are equally robust and provide additional testimony to the enduring value of debate education. Much of that literature has been collected in an annotated bibliography compiled by Sarah Spring, Joseph Packer, and Timothy O’Donnell (see Appendix 1). 1. Critical Thinking Developing critical-thinking skills is one of the primary goals of American education. A survey by the Higher Education Research Institute (2009) of 22,562 full-time college and university faculty members reported that 99.6% of them viewed critical-thinking skills as paramount to undergraduate education. Several national reports (Association of American Colleges and Universities 1985; National Educational Goals Panel 1991; National Institute of Education Study Group 1984) have identified critical thinking as a major goal of higher education. Many have written about the importance of critical thinking to achieving a free, safe, and prosperous society. Richard Franke, a fellow of the National Academy of Sciences, observes: “the value of critical thinking is incalculable. From assessing markets to identifying the salient features of a policy to decisions about life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, critical thinking clears a path for rational judgment” (2009, 22). Argumentation professors Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede recognize that in the nuclear age, it is imperative for society to develop leaders with strong critical-thinking skills: “in an age when a single bomb can wipe out a great city, critical thinking is not a luxury but a necessity” (1978, 3). Edward Panetta and Dale Herbeck argue that critical-thinking skills developed by policy-debate training “will help resolve impending geo-political crises” (1993, 25). John Dewey considered critical-thinking skills to be an essential characteristic of good citizenship, and subsequent work has demonstrated this connection. Critical-thinking skills are a precondition for citizenship engagement and deliberation about public affairs (Owen 2004). For example, Jack Rogers (2005) shows that debaters are more likely than nondebaters to vote in elections and to participate in social and political campaigns. Debate scholars claim that the teaching of critical-thinking skills is one of debate’s greatest educational achievements. Enhancing critical thinking is “the most frequently cited educational merit of debate” (Omelicheva 2007, 163). Glenn Capp and Thelma Capp (1965) list critical thinking as one of the seven educational benefits to debate training. James McBath argues that debate provides an educational laboratory for training students in “critical thinking skills through the discovery of lines of argument and their probative value” (1984, 10). Edward Inch, Barbara Warnick, and Danielle Endres state “that intercollegiate debate provides students with an intensive and exciting method for developing their debating skills and critical thinking abilities” (2006, 354). Austin Freeley and David Steinberg contend, “since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking” (2005, 2). Lived experience is reflected in the opinion of former debaters’ assessment of acquiring critical-thinking skills. Several demographic surveys (Katsulas and Bauschard 2000; Matlon and Keele 1984; Williams, McGee, and Worth 2001) reveal overwhelming support from former debaters that the activity sharpened their critical-thinking skills. In response to the survey by John Katsulas and Stefan Bauschard, Daniel Sutherland, the National Debate Tournament (NDT) winner in 1982, replied, “debate significantly enhanced my development as a lawyer. I think the major area is in critical thinking—understanding my own arguments, coming to grips with my opponents’ arguments and forecasting how the judge might evaluate both positions” (Katsulas and Bauschard 2000, 7). Cynthia Leiferman, an NDT finalist in 1984, agreed, writing that debate training taught her how “to think ‘outside the box.’ Creative critical thinking is the lifeblood for a successful litigator” (ibid.). Additionally, empirical research demonstrates that debate training increases critical-thinking skills. Several studies comparing debaters to nondebaters substantiate this link. Kent Colbert’s (1987) study of NDT and Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA) debaters found that they scored substantially higher than nondebaters on the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (WGCTA). This research tool measures critical-thinking ability in five areas: “inference, recognition of assumptions, deduction, interpretation, and evaluation of arguments” (Colbert 1987, 199). Colbert’s study validated the results of prior studies (Cross 1971; Howell 1943; Jackson 1961; Williams 1951) showing a link between debate participation and critical thinking. Using a different measuring technique, studies by Kenny Barfield (1989) and Kip McKee (2003) also demonstrate a positive link between debate and critical thinking. Barfield and McKee found that high school debaters scored substantially higher than nondebaters in reading comprehension and thinking skills on the Stanford Achievement Test (SAT). Because research proves that higher reading comprehension scores on the SAT correlate well with higher criticalthinking skills on the WGCTA, Barfield and McKee’s findings prove that debate participation enhances critical thinking. The most definitive evidence comes from a meta analysis by Mike Allen et al. (1999), which examined data from 22 studies over 50 years that had explored the link between communication skills and critical thinking. Most of these studies used the WGCTA as their measurement instrument. The cumulative evidence indicated that communication skill instruction increased criticalthinking ability by 44%. However, “participation in forensics demonstrated the largest improvement in critical thinking whether considering longitudinal or cross-sectional designs” (Allen et al. 1999, 27). Allen et al. conclude that competitive debate enhances critical thinking more effectively than argumentation classes and public speaking. This study provides powerful support for the value of competitive debate to improve critical thinking. Given all of the above evidence, Colbert’s assessment that “the preponderance of defendable evidence suggests competitive debate experience can indeed improve critical thinking skills” is a valid conclusion (1995, 60). He also correctly points out that the few studies (e.g., Whalen 1991) not demonstrating a link suffer from flaws in “design limitations, instrument ceiling, sampling, teaching methods, or statistical procedures” (Colbert 1995, 60). How does debate teach effective critical-thinking skills? There are numerous ways. Debate teaches analytical skills, whereby students practice identifying errors in reasoning and proof, recognizing inconsistencies in arguments, assessing the credibility of sources, challenging assumptions, and prioritizing the salience of points (Murphy and Samosky 1993). Critical thinking requires that decision makers arrive at conclusions based on a careful examination of the facts and reasons, which is the heart of the methodology taught by debate. Jeffrey Parcher (1998) argues that the devil’s advocacy approach to debating, whereby students argue both sides of a controversy, improves critical thinking. Research also shows that critical-thinking skills are developed through consistent practice, which debate tournament competitions afford to students (McKee 2003) 2. Leadership Training and Career Advancement Debate is a “premier training ground for the future leaders of this country” (O’Donnell 2008b, A38). The former debaters who occupy prestigious leadership positions in law, education, government, politics, and business have long constituted an illustrious club. Brilliant lawyers who were former debaters include Alan Dershowitz, famous criminal appellate attorney and Harvard law professor; Thomas Goldstein, cofounder of SCOTUSBLOG and a litigator who has argued over 20 cases before the U.S. Supreme Court; Laurence Tribe, preeminent constitutional law professor of Harvard; Erwin Chemerinsky, founding dean of the University of California, Irvine School of Law; and Neal Katyal, the deputy solicitor general of the United States. Prominent educators include three former college presidents: Alexander Meiklejohn of Amherst College, Lawrence Summers of Harvard, and David B. Henry of the University of Illinois. At least two active college presidents, David Boren of the University of Oklahoma and John Sexton of New York University, were debaters. Politicians include six U.S. presidents who served during the twentieth century, including John F. Kennedy Jr., and numerous U.S. senators and representatives. Titans from the world of business include Lee Iacocca, former CEO of Chrysler, Ted Turner, the media and entertainment mogul, and Ross Perot, billionaire businessman and former presidential candidate. A plethora of evidence exists to support the claim that participation in debate facilitates the professional careers of students. Numerous surveys of former debaters have overwhelmingly found that debate participation was a positive influence in advancing their careers. Ronald Matlon and Lucy Keele’s survey of 703 debaters who participated in the NDT found that “successful attorneys, educators, legislators, businesspersons, and consultants” stated unequivocally “that debate was as important as the total of the rest of their education, or more so” (1984, 205). A survey of former debaters by Jeffrey Hobbs and Robert Chandler (1991) arrived at similar findings, with 86% of the respondents recommending debate as beneficial training, including 75% of lawyers, 85% of managers, 97% of ministers, and 84% of teachers. David Zarefsky, a past president of the National Communication Association, a distinguished professor of communication at Northwestern, and an immensely successful debater and coach, says, “It’s hard for me to imagine a profession for which debate is not a valuable kind of preparation” (Wade 2006). Evidence from two longitudinal studies comparing the employment success of debaters and nondebaters provides empirical support for the claim that debate participation enhances career skills (Rogers 2002, 2005). In the first longitudinal study, Jack Rogers (2002) tracked the performance of 100 freshmen who were debaters versus 100 nondebaters over four years. The results showed that upon graduation, the debaters received job offers superior to those of the control group. Rogers concluded there is “a strong correlation between debate experience and involvement in professional internships,” which resulted in the debaters receiving a higher rate of job offers upon graduation as compared with the nondebaters (2002, 16). In a follow-up study, Rogers (2005) examined the performance of this same group of students over four additional years. Once again, the results showed the debate group with superior career advancement. The study found that debaters received more job offers in their field, more positive evaluations from their supervisors, and slightly higher pay increments. Especially in the field of law, debate training is overwhelmingly beneficial. A survey of 98 law school deans found that 70% of them recommended that students should participate in intercollegiate debate (Freeley and Steinberg 2005). Most prelaw academic counselors also advise undergraduates to take courses in argumentation and debate (Pfau, Thomas, and Ulrich 1987). A survey directed to 82 prominent lawyers who were former debaters asking about the benefits of collegiate debating revealed strong support for the belief that debate taught them skills in oral advocacy, critical thinking, brief writing, research, and listening (Katsulas and Bauschard 2000). Law school dean Erwin Chemerinsky credits his debate training for teaching him skills in analysis, research, and public speaking and he claims that “not a day goes by that I do not use the skills and lessons I learned in debate in my teaching, my writing, and my advocacy in courts” (2008, A11). While the law remains the preferred career choice for many debaters, the skills taught by debate are just as necessary and useful for debaters who want to succeed in the world of business. Employers recognize this and perceive debating experience as a valuable asset. Bill Lawhorn, an economist with the Bureau of Labor Statistics, speaks about the value of debate training for employers: “Debaters must have strong research skills, be able to think quickly, and be able to communicate well. In addition, debaters must be comfortable performing in front of an audience—and having the confidence to do so is a valuable workplace skill, especially when it comes to making presentations to coworkers or superiors” (Lawhorn 2008, 19). Several large companies have been established and are being operated by for-mer debaters. For instance, Michael Beckley, a former Emory debater, and Marc Wilson, a former Dartmouth debater, cofounded Appian, a fast-growing software company. Beckley and Wilson credit their debate training for affording them the presentation skills to persuade clients such as Home Depot to use Appian’s software instead of that of larger companies such as Oracle and IBM (D. Jones 2004). Beckley and Wilson go so far as to say that their company, which has grown to 190 employees, would never have existed without their debate background (D. Jones 2004). Other former debaters who are CEOs of successful companies include Lance Rosenzweig of PeopleSupport, Chuck Berger of Nuance Communications, Mark Astone of Panagraph, Tod Loofbourrow of Authoria, and Cynthia McKay of Le Gourmet Gift Basket (ibid.). Management consulting firms also recognize the value of hiring debaters. A.T. Kearney, a global management firm with offices in 34 countries, has actively sought to hire former debaters after being highly impressed with the job skills brought by Leslie Mueller, a former Northwestern debater (Ross 2002). Mueller now attends debate tournaments to recruit prospective employees because she says debaters have superior analytic and communication skills (ibid.). 3. Academic Achievement in the Classroom College educators overwhelmingly believe that participation in debate increases students’ academic achievement. Melissa Wade, the director of forensics at Emory University, who has coached thousands of high school and college debaters over two decades, says that the value of debate training is well documented: “the effect on academic achievement has been measured and confirmed to improve critical thinking, research and communication and organization skills” (2006, 1). Kent Colbert and Thompson Biggers share this view: “the educational benefits of debate seem to be well documented: improved communication skills; exposure to important social issues of our time; improvement of critical thinking ability” (1985, 238). In fact, there is considerable empirical evidence to prove that academic debate boosts academic achievement. Several studies show that debaters achieve higher average grade point averages than nondebaters (Barfield 1989; Collier 2004; Hunt, Garard, and Simerly 1997; K. Jones 1994). It is also the case that almost three-quarters of debaters believe that involvement in debate benefits them academically (Hunt, Garard, and Simerly 1997). Jack Rogers (2002) found that debaters maintained higher grade point averages than nondebaters, matriculated at the same rate as nondebaters, and enjoyed a higher acceptance rate into graduate school programs. In another study, Rogers (2005) determined that debaters were more successful than nondebaters in completing their graduate studies and achieving higher scores on their LSATs and GREs. Debate participation improves academic performance because it promotes numerous skills that are essential to realizing a high level of educational proficiency. The educational benefits of debate include teaching research skills, acquiring cross-disciplinary knowledge about the world, learning how to organize and construct arguments, improving writing skills, enhancing listening and note-taking skills, increasing student self-confidence, and improving timemanagement skills. a. Research One of the obvious benefits of policy debate is that it teaches research skills in a manner “unparalleled in the world of academics” (Fritch 1993/1994, 7). No undergraduate college class assignment requires as much research as debate does. Robert Rowland argues that “debate, more than perhaps any other educational activity at the university level, teaches students about both the importance of research and the wealth of material that is available” (1995, 101). The research effort undertaken by debaters over the course of a single year’s topic is often greater than the work to obtain a law degree or dissertation (Parcher 1998). Many debaters spend as many as 20 to 30 hours per week doing research (ibid.). A typical debate team gathers enough evidence to write thousands of pages of argument briefs. This emphasis on research is due to several factors. Because debaters are required to debate both sides of a topic, they must collect evidence to support a myriad of arguments. Debate judges also reward evidence more than oratory. There is an expectation that debaters are required to support every point with evidence (Panetta 1990). Therefore, everyone has a competitive incentive to collect as much evidence as possible. In many cases, the best researchers are the most successful debaters (Cheshire 2002). Because doing research is so integral to competitive success, debaters have a strong incentive to acquire excellent research skills. Unlike most undergraduates who specialize in doing research in their own area of academic study, debaters require expansive research skills. Even when a debate topic is confined to a particular subject area, for example, reducing U.S. agricultural subsidies, debate arguments will emerge requiring research in the fields of economics, political science, law, international relations, the environment, and philosophy. This means debaters must learn to use all available library databases as well as locate evidence from books, government documents, newspapers, and the Internet. The process of doing debate research is also making debaters more proficient in using computers and a wide variety of new and emerging technologies. On a regular basis, debaters utilize computerized research databases to conduct research (Freeley and Steinberg 2005). While no studies have been done on this point, observational evidence suggests that debaters are more skilled than nondebaters in using sophisticated searching techniques. Because debaters need to locate evidence that supports very precise claims, they become skilled at conducting Boolean searches where words such as OR, AND, AND NOT, and NEAR are inserted to create relationships among keywords in a search query. Debate also teaches techniques in using scanners. Many debate squads now require students to produce their research in digital form. This requires debaters to scan evidence that cannot be downloaded electronically from books and periodicals. Debate alumni strongly support the belief that debate participation improves research skills. In surveys that ask former debaters how their participation in debate has benefited them, developing research skills is always mentioned as a valued benefit (Hobbs and Chandler 1991; Matlon and Keele 1984). In the most recent studies, the value of research skills has increased in importance. In a survey of lawyers who debated during the 1990s, Katsulas and Bauschard (2000) found that acquiring research skills was ranked as the second greatest benefit of debate participation. A survey by Doyle Srader (2006) of former debaters who are now college educators (but not debate coaches) cited the acquisition of research skills as the most important educational benefit of debate. In a survey of former NDT and CEDA debaters, David Williams, Brian McGee, and David Worth report that a high percentage of these debaters viewed the acquisition of research skills “to be a valued element of debate participation” (2001, 201). b. Student Knowledge About the World The knowledge gained by students competing in debate is wide-ranging and substantial. As soon as the college topic area is announced in mid-May, students begin background reading on the topic. When the actual topic wording is announced in July, the intensity of the research effort accelerates to a vigorous pace, as debaters scramble to find as many research materials as possible before the first tournament in September. From this point forward until the last tournament in early April, arguments are revised and created on a continuous basis. During the course of one debate season, a debate team will produce thousands of pages of argument briefs. Individually, every debater will be responsible for reading and carefully filing them. The range of cumulative knowledge accrued from compounding several years of debate, is even more astounding. For example, 2009 graduates who debated in each of the past four years, have learned a great deal about four public policy topics: (1) increasing U.S. economic and diplomatic pressure on China; (2) overruling U.S. Supreme court cases involving federalism, school racial segregation, abortion, and military commissions; (3) promoting U.S. constructive engagement with Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority; and (4) reducing U.S. agricultural subsidies. Any student who debated over these four years would have learned an incredible amount about some of the great issues and controversies of the twenty-first century. Should the United States engage or confront China? Can U.S. economic pressure force China to respect human rights and intellectual property rights? Should the Supreme Court allow the federal government to have greater control over state governments? Do U.S. military commission trials for enemy combatants violate international law? Can U.S. diplomacy with Syria promote peace in the Middle East? Will constructive engagement prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons? Will increasing U.S. troops to Afghanistan promote peace? Do industrial farming practices threaten the environment? Do government subsidies for biofuels reduce U.S. energy dependency and global warming? In fact, over a four-year academic debate career, “students grapple with virtually every contemporary issue of American public policy” (O’Donnell 2008b). However, debaters learn much more than topic knowledge. They also learn a great deal about political institutions and practice. The policy-systems approach essential to intercollegiate debate teaches students about the intricacies of how the three branches of the U.S. government operate. Debaters also learn about current events because they are forced to imagine the passage of controversial policies derived from the yearlong intercollegiate debate topic in a contemporaneous political climate that involves political costs and trade-offs with other agenda items under consideration. This means that in any given year, the top agenda items being pursued in Washington will be hotly debated in the form of politics disadvantages. For example, if the topic requires the affirmative team to advocate reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, a negative team might argue that doing so at this time would trade off with ongoing health care reform efforts.

#### Aiding the *reformist Left* in its pursuit of *attainable political goals* is the only way to *significantly reduce suffering*

Rorty 98 - American philosopher @ Stanford (Richard, <https://www.amazon.com/Achieving-Our-Country-Leftist-Twentieth-Century/dp/0674003128>, EM)

The cultural Left often seems convinced that the nation-state is obsolete, and that there is therefore no point in attempting to revive national politics. The trouble with this claim is that the government of our nation-state will be, for the foreseeable future, the only agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Americans. It is no comfort to those in danger of being immiserated by globalization to be told that, since national governments are now irrelevant, we must think up a replacement for such governments. The cosmopolitan super-rich do not think any replacements are needed, and they are likely to prevail. Bill Readings was right to say that 11the nation-state [has ceased] to be the elemental unit of capitalism. •• but it remains the entity which makes decisions about social benefits, and thus about social justice. 12 The current leftist habit of taking the long view and looking beyond nationhood to a global polity is as useless as was faith in Marx's philosophy of history, for which it has become a substitute. Both are equally irrelevant to the question of how to prevent the reemergence of hereditary castes or of how to prevent right-wing populists from taking advantage of resentment at that reemergence. When we think about these latter questions, we begin to realize that one of the essential transformations which the cultural Left will have to undergo is the shedding of its semiconscious anti-Americanism, which it carried over from the rage of the late Sixties . This Left will have to stop thinking up ever more abstract and abusive names for “the system" and start trying to construct inspiring images of the country. Only by doing so can it begin to form alliances with people outside the academy-and, specifically, with the labor unions. Outside the academy, Americans still want to feel patriotic. They still want to feel part of a nation which can take control of its destiny and make itself a better place. If the Left forms no such alliances, it will never have any effect on the laws of the United States. To form them will require the cultural Left to forget about Baudrillard's account of America as Disneyland-as a country of simulacra-and to start proposing changes in the laws of a real country, inhabited by real people who are enduring unnecessary suffering, much of which can be cured by governmental action. 13 Nothing would do more to resurrect the American Left than agreement on a concrete political platform, a People's Charter, a list of specific reforms. The existence of such a listendlessly reprinted and debated, equally familiar to professors and production workers , imprinted on the memory both of professional people and of those who clean the professionals ' toilets-might revitalize leftist politics. 1 4 The problems which can be cured by governmental action, and which such a list would canvass, are mostly those that stem from selfishness rather than sadism. But to bring about such cures it would help if the Left would change the tone in which it now discusses sadism. The pre-Sixties reformist Left, insofar as it concerned itself with oppressed minorities, did so by proclaiming that all of us-black, white, and brown-are Americans, and that we should respect one another as such. This strategy gave rise to the "platoon" movies, which showed Americans of various ethnic backgrounds fighting and dying side by side. By contrast, the contemporary cultural Left urges that America should not be a melting-pot, because we need to respect one another in our differences. This Left wants to preserve otherness rather than ignore it. The distinction between the old strategy and the new is important. The choice between them makes the difference between what Todd Gitlin calls "common dreams" and what Arthur Schlesinger calls "disuniting America." To take pride in being black or gay is an entirely reasonable response to the sadistic humiliation to which one has been subjected. But insofar as this pride prevents someone from also taking pride in being an American citizen, from thinking of his or her country as capable of reform, or from being able to join with straights or whites in reformist initiatives, it is a political disaster.

#### *Effective antitrust advocacy* is essential for efforts to mitigate an *ongoing* *economic nightmare* for marginalized groups

Greer and Rice 21—co-founders and co-executive directors of Liberation in a Generation (Jeremie and Solana, “Anti-Monopoly Activism: Reclaiming Power through Racial Justice,” <https://www.liberationinageneration.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Anti-Monopoly-Activism_032021.pdf>, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

Since the founding of the nation, people of color have been living an economic nightmare. People of color have persistently lagged behind white people in nearly every economic category, including employment, income, education, small-business ownership, home ownership, and asset-ownership. This is the result of the rise and reach of concentrated wealth and power, including monopoly power. The Racial Wealth Gap Economic racial disparities do not happen by accident. Rather, they are the product of centuries of systemic racism and have been built into the design of our economic system, which has created what we at Liberation in a Generation call the Oppression Economy. The Oppression Economy uses the racist tools of theft, exclusion, and 31 exploitation to strip wealth from people of color, so that the elite can build their wealth. In this Oppression Economy, racism is profitable, and it fuels a cycle of oppression 32 that depresses the economic vitality of people of color, suppresses our political power, and obstructs our ability to utilize democracy to change economic rules that make racism profitable in the first place. Racial wealth inequality is the consequential disease caused by the Oppression Economy. Today, racial wealth inequality has reached astronomical levels and will continue to rise if nothing is done. Without drastic policy action it will take 228 years for average Black wealth and 84 years for average Latinx wealth to match the wealth that white households hold today. Further, if nothing is done—or we attempt to return 33 to “normal” and fail to distance racism34 after COVID-19—Black and Latinx wealth will reach zero sometime in the middle of this century. These disparities are driven by 35 36 two reinforcing phenomena connected to the issue of corporate concentration: 1) the systematic withholding of wealth from people of color and 2) the gross concentration of wealth held by the corporate elite. Between 1983 and 2016, which coincides with the rise of corporate and monopoly power, average Black and Latinx wealth was dwarfed [outpaced] by the wealth accumulated by white households. In fact, average Black wealth decreased by more than 50 percent over this period. This is the result of a long history of economic oppression that has 37 actively blocked people of color from building wealth or has stripped their wealth through theft and predation. The beneficiaries and perpetrators of this ever-growing gap are the corporate elite who set the rules of the economy. The corporate elite’s actions have led to people of color being paid less for their labor and having to pay more for the basic necessities of life. Here are a few metrics that speak to this reality. • Black, Indigenous, and Latinx women earn between 55 cents and 63 cents for every dollar earned by white men.38 • Low income people of color often pay a 10 percent poverty premium for essential goods and services.39 • Black and Latinx households are far more likely than white households to be unable to pay their monthly bills or cover unexpected expenses.40 • Black households are more likely to be denied mortgage credit and end up paying more when they are able to access credit.41 • Black households, in particular, suffer from a crippling debt burden composed of an array of predatory credit products (e.g., student, small-dollar, auto, and home loans). The phenomenon fueling racial wealth inequality is the concentration of wealth in the hands of a small number of individuals. Today, the wealthiest 400 people in the US hold more wealth ($3.2 trillion) than the entire Latinx population ($2.4 trillion)and 43 more than 70 percent of the Black population combined ($4.41 trillion). While the 44 average wealth of Black people has decreased since the 1980s (as cited earlier), the average wealth of those on Forbes’s list of the 400 wealthiest people increased from $600 million in 1982 (adjusted for inflation) to $8.0billion in 2020.. You might be 45 asking, what does the Forbes 400have to do with monopoly? Well, it is a who’s who of corporate monopolists. The people on this list are some of the most egregious perpetrators of driving down wages, expanding income inequality, degrading the health of workers, desecrating the environment, fleecing consumers, perpetuating racial residential segregation, driving community disinvestment, avoiding taxes, and corrupting our democracy. These monopolists utilize ruthless business practices to perpetuate their unquenchable thirst for maximized profits and for control of major segments of the US economy—and people of color bear the brunt. America’s Legacy of Racism Drives and Sustains Corporate Concentration The confluence of monopoly power and racial inequality is not new. The construction of an economy that relies on unchecked capitalism to create the modern-day monopolist relies on the construction and maintenance of America’s racial caste system. The legacy of theft, exclusion, and exploitation of people of color by corporate monopolists has been with us since the founding of the nation. In fact, prior to the Civil War, southern plantation owners were the equivalent of the modern-day Fortune 500 monopolists. The Mississippi Valley had more millionaires per capita than anywhere in the country, making it the Silicon Valley of that period. Prior to the Civil War, the combined value of America’s approximately 4 million slaves was $3.5 billion, making it the largest single financial asset in the entire economy, bigger than all manufacturing and railroads combined.46 As the roots of this problem run deep and disproportionately impact people of color, so too must the solutions. Today’s corporate monopolies are built on the foundation of an economy that also stole land from Indigenous people through genocide and forced removal, and built a labor market on the bodies of enslaved Black people. Nothing in our economy is race-neutral, including our work to dismantle monopoly power and the racial wealth inequality it causes, so we must seek race-conscious solutions. Scholars have developed a catalogue of research confirming what many people of color experience on a daily basis: Corporations have seized control of many aspects of our lives that were once intended to serve the public good over private sector interests. Examples include the growth of charter schools and for-profit colleges as an alternative to public schools; the growth of private health insurance and private hospitals; the growth of private prisons and paid services in prison, such as phone calls and health care. However, more research is needed that connects the economic conditions of people of color to the growth of monopoly power, a call to action we further explore in Section 6. Connecting Monopoly Power to Other Movements There is no silver bullet to slaying the monster that is systemic racism. Leaders of color across the country are actively organizing people of color to advance bold and transformational economic and racial justice policies. These leaders are doing the hard work of transforming our economic systems by advancing liberatory policies such as a Homes Guarantee and a federal jobs guarantee; and by dismantling systems of oppression, including police and prison abolition, ending voter suppression, and curbing corporate power. To this end, anti-monopoly policy and advocacy work can be a powerful tool to advance these transformative, activist-led movement priorities. To win the battle to advance movement priorities, we must seek to pull every lever of power at our disposal and to directly confront one of their most ardent political opponents: corporate monopolies. The Action Center on Race and the Economy (ACRE) is deftly integrating anti-monopoly tactics to advance their racial and economic justice mission. In advancing police abolition, for example, they highlight the fact that big banks (as discussed in Section 1) finance “police brutality bonds” that fund the payment of police department settlements for acts of police brutality.47 Additionally, they have highlighted for grassroots leaders of color the connections that corporate monopolies have to anti-Muslim bigotry, the Puerto Rican debt crisis, and pharmaceutical prices.48 Corporate monopolists, including big banks, big tech, and big pharma, are often primary opponents in the battles for bold, transformational movement priorities. For example, activists for bold environmental justice policies, such as the Green New Deal, have encountered strong opposition from fossil fuel monopolies, such as Exxon, Shell and BP; but also, Wall Street bank monopolies financing fossil fuel monopolies, in addition to other monopolies in the airline industry. In another example, Wall Street 49 monopolies have aggressively clashed with affordable housing advocates as their investments have displaced residents of color from their homes and businesses and have also gentrified communities of color from Harlem to Oakland and Detroit to New Orleans. Directly challenging the monopoly power of these corporations could prove to be a useful tactic for activists of color to further movement priorities.

### 1NC---OFF

Cap K

#### The 1AC’s “re-thinking of thinking” trades off with a materialist approach necessary to confront capitalism

Alyson Escalante 19, M.A., Department of Philosophy @ University of Oregon, 9-08-2019, “Truth and Practice: The Marxist Theory of Knowledge,” https://failingthatinvent.home.blog/2019/09/08/truth-and-practic-the-marxist-theory-of-knowledge/

Other thinkers such as Foucault would go on to focus on the way that knowledge relates to power, with an emphasis on the way in which theories of knowledge serve to justify certain arrangements of power. For Foucault, on of most important project is to uncover “subjugated knowledges” which have been obscured by dominant theories of knowledge. History for Foucault is not a matter of class struggle but of decentralized movements of power wherein new ideas combat old. The focus in Foucault’s work is on understanding ideas in relation to an abstract notion of power. This stands in stark contrast to the Marxist view which understands ideas in relation to the material conditions of the world in which we live, with primary emphasis given to the class arrangement of our society. Foucault denounced Marxism as an outdated mode of thought that was thoroughly trapped within older theories of knowledge and certainty. As such, he pushed against an emphasis on class struggle and instead promoted an abstract idea of resistance which could be enacted on a local and personal level. For Foucault, there is no objective truth that can be uncovered; instead there are competing discourses which can be understood in their specific historical moments.

There are countless other postmodern and proto-postmodern thinkers who embraced skepticism for various reasons. These thinkers mostly focused on the historically bound nature of knowledge, emphasizing the way that our own historical and social context limit our ability to understand the world around us. They facilitated a shift in politics from collective class struggle against our class enemies to local resistance to abstract and ill-defined notions of power. In this sense, they used skepticism to push back against the possibility of a revolutionary science.

I will not refute these theorists here, because I am attempting to write specifically to other Marxists who desire to better understand a the theory of knowledge which underpins scientific socialism. It is worth nothing however, that these theorists rejected the very epistemological core of Marxism and therefore served bourgeois interests. If truth cannot actually be attained, if knowledge is nothing more than competing discourses, then it is not possible for us to come up with a universal and unified theory of knowledge which could guide revolutionary struggle. As such, Marxists must insist on the possibility for true ideas to be ascertained. We must insist that practice in the form of revolutionary struggle can help us develop true ideas, and we must demonstrate that those ideas in turn further our struggle and help us achieve success.

We must be able to look to past struggles and determine which universal truths were derived from those struggles. We can look to the October revolution, for example, and see that Lenin’s theory of a revolutionary vanguard party showed itself to be correct in the Russian revolutionary struggle. We can further see that it continued to be proved correct in the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions. Therefore, we can insist that the Leninist theory of the revolutionary vanguard party is true. For Marxists, this isn’t a matter of opinion, it’s not a historical truth bound to the 20th century, and it’s not just one discourse of revolution competing with others. Marxism must stand at odds with skeptical and postmodern theories of knowledge in order for it to claim to be a scientific approach to socialism at all.

The problem is not simply that skepticism has been used by bourgeois liberals to reject Marxism. Although he is not a Marxist himself, philosopher Bruno Latour has demonstrated that postmodern skepticism of truth and the possibility of developing a scientific approach to politics has become a tool for explicitly reactionary and right wing political actors. In his text, Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam, Latour notes that right wing capitalists have weaponized the language of skepticism and the limits of scientific knowledge to deny the reality of climate change. Capitalists have begun to obscure their own destruction of the environment by insisting that scientific knowledge isn’t totally possible, and that science is just one more discourse among many. They insist that we cannot trust the scientific evidence of capitalist driven climate change because science is just one theory of knowledge which can’t be said to be universally true. He notes that the Foucault’s conflation of knowledge with power has not challenged imperialist institutions, evidenced by the fact that the US DARPA intelligence unit has adopted the motto “knowledge is power.” The idea that truth does not exist, or that it is not knowable, has not challenged capitalist and fascist social forces, it has only aided them by attempting to destroy the scientific basis of revolutionary resistance to capitalism.

Unfortunately, many on the left have embraced a sort of postmodern skepticism towards the possibility of truth. In doing so, they have abandoned the central epistemological core of Marxism. It is crucial for Marxists today to insist that truth exists, can be ascertained, and that only practice is capable of ascertaining it. If we abandon this view, we abandon the ability to wield knowledge as a weapon against the capitalist class. That is something that we cannot allow.

#### Rejectionism undermines any basis for collective political action---that makes breaking down capitalism impossible

Mari RUTI 17. Professor of critical theory and of sexual diversity studies, University of Toronto. *The Ethics of Opting Out: Queer Theory’s Defiant Subjects*. Columbia University Press. 37-9. Modified for ableist language.

In Halberstam's world of queer failure, antinormativity has become a default politico-ethical stance to such an extent that what matters is not the practical viability but rather the sheer extremity (or rhetorical allure) of the arguments made. This is a problem that reaches well beyond Halberstam and that I will return to repeatedly in this book, namely, that the strand of queer theory that advocates various versions of the ethics of opting out often promotes the ideal of antinormativity so indiscriminately that one act of defiance seems just as good as any other, irrespective of the "content," let alone the outcome, of the act in question. I would say that this is, broadly speaking, one of the main shortcomings of contemporary progressive theory, including queer theory. In its eagerness to reach the next radical edge, the most hyperbolic position conceivable to stand on, this theory sometimes misses its aim, as I think Halberstam at points does, and as Edelman perhaps does in aligning queerness with the death drive and as Puar perhaps does in aligning queerness with suicide terrorism.

This is a politics of negativity devoid of any clear political or ethical vision: it wants to destroy what exists without giving us much of a sense of what should exist. It may of course be that offering an alternative politicoethical vision is more or less impossible. Perhaps it is not the task of theory to define the future but merely to critique the present. In principle, I do not have a problem with the idea that the purpose of theory is to show us what is wrong rather than to tell us what to do. At the same time, I am more inclined to look for "real-life" referents for my theoretical paradigms than those who believe that theory is-or should be-an imaginative activity wholly divorced from the exigencies of lived reality. On the one hand, the latter attitude is freeing in the sense that suddenly anything is possible, including the idea that stupidity represents a radical politicoethical project. But on the other, it can lead to what Lacan calls "empty" speech, speech devoid of any meaning (pure rhetoric). It is from this partly unconvinced perspective that I would like to start putting pressure on three interrelated tendencies within recent queer theory. I will return to each of these tendencies in greater detail in later chapters. Here let me merely name them briefly.

First, I do not think that the celebration of negativity for its own sake that characterizes some versions of queer theory amounts to much (besides explosive rhetoric). I prefer to work with negativity, to see what negativity can do for us. In the next two chapters, I will try to illustrate that this is what Lacan sought to do, despite Edelman's efforts to tell us otherwise. Second, I think that the semiautomatic-and therefore no longer honestly critical-attempt to annihilate "the subject" that runs through much of progressive theory, including queer theory, is a theoretical and politicoethical dead end. Though I understand the historical reasons for the assault on the humanist subject, I wonder about the almost ritualistic manner in which the slaughter of "the subject" gets undertaken from text to text, as if thinkers such as Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze somehow botched the job back in the 1960s and 1970s. It seems to me that this all-too predictable battering of the subject represents a theoretical repetition compulsion in the strictly Freudian sense, indicating, among other things, a traumatic fixation that keeps us from moving to new conceptual terrains, including the question of what it might mean to be a subject after the collapse of the unified, arrogant, and self-mastering subject of humanist metaphysics. Of all the recurring themes of queer theory, the assault on the subject is what, for me, gives the strongest impression of empty speech, for it seems to have virtually nothing to do with the personal realities of those who advocate it, most of whom live semicoherent, semicontinous lives in semiconsistent (usually tenured) lifeworlds.

Third, I think that queer theory's antinormativity can all too easily lose track of the continued need for normative justice: the kind of justice that makes judgments about the "right" or "wrong" of things. Though I am well aware of the ways in which traditional normative systems have been used violently to exclude, vilify, and mortify queer subjects, and though I have no wish to argue for "objective" foundations of justice, it seems to me that if we are to posit, say, that the dominance of heteropatriarchy represents a social injustice, then we have to have some normative grounds for making this claim, for pronouncing it "wrong." Antinormativity, in short, always retains an implicit normative content. I would say that queer theory's willful blindness [ignorance] to this fact-the attitude that says that "we" reject all norms as oppressive-represents the kind of theoretical bad faith that leads to various politico-ethical hypocrisies, such as a reliance on the much-maligned "liberals" to uphold the very principles of justice that queer theory likes to subject to a thorough (and again, ritualistic) trashing.

#### Capitalism causes war, violence, environmental destruction and extinction

Robinson, PhD Sociology, 16 (William I, professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/35596-sadistic-capitalism-six-urgent-matters-for-humanity-in-global-crisis>)

In these mean streets of globalized capitalism in crisis, it has become profitable to turn poverty and inequality into a tourist attraction. The South African Emoya Luxury Hotel and Spa company has made a glamorized spectacle of it. The resort recently advertised an opportunity for tourists to stay "in our unique Shanty Town ... and experience traditional township living within a safe private game reserve environment." A cluster of simulated shanties outside of Bloemfontein that the company has constructed "is ideal for team building, braais, bachelors [parties], theme parties and an experience of a lifetime," read the ad. The luxury accommodations, made to appear from the outside as shacks, featured paraffin lamps, candles, a battery-operated radio, an outside toilet, a drum and fireplace for cooking, as well as under-floor heating, air conditioning and wireless internet access. A well-dressed, young white couple is pictured embracing in a field with the corrugated tin shanties in the background. The only thing missing in this fantasy world of sanitized space and glamorized poverty was the people themselves living in poverty. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation. The "luxury shanty town" in South Africa is a fitting metaphor for global capitalism as a whole. Faced with a stagnant global economy, elites have managed to turn war, structural violence and inequality into opportunities for capital, pleasure and entertainment. It is hard not to conclude that unchecked capitalism has become what I term "sadistic capitalism," in which the suffering and deprivation generated by capitalism become a source of aesthetic pleasure, leisure and entertainment for others. I recently had the opportunity to travel through several countries in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, East Asia and throughout North America. I was on sabbatical to research what the global crisis looks like on the ground around the world. Everywhere I went, social polarization and political tensions have reached explosive dimensions. Where is the crisis headed, what are the possible outcomes and what does it tell us about global capitalism and resistance? This crisis is not like earlier structural crises of world capitalism, such as in the 1930s or 1970s. This one is fast becoming systemic. The crisis of humanity shares aspects of earlier structural crises of world capitalism, but there are six novel, interrelated dimensions to the current moment that I highlight here, in broad strokes, as the "big picture" context in which countries and peoples around the world are experiencing a descent into chaos and uncertainty. 1) The level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented in the face of out-of-control, over-accumulated capital. In January 2016, the development agency Oxfam published a follow-up to its report on global inequality that had been released the previous year. According to the new report, now just 62 billionaires -- down from 80 identified by the agency in its January 2015 report -- control as much wealth as one half of the world's population, and the top 1% owns more wealth than the other 99% combined. Beyond the transnational capitalist class and the upper echelons of the global power bloc, the richest 20 percent of humanity owns some 95 percent of the world's wealth, while the bottom 80 percent has to make do with just 5 percent. This 20-80 divide of global society into haves and the have-nots is the new global social apartheid. It is evident not just between rich and poor countries, but within each country, North and South, with the rise of new affluent high-consumption sectors alongside the downward mobility, "precariatization," destabilization and expulsion of majorities. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation: The transnational capitalist class cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to stagnation in the world economy. The signs of an impending depression are everywhere. The front page of the February 20 issue of The Economist read, "The World Economy: Out of Ammo?" Extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge to dominant groups. They strive to purchase the loyalty of that 20 percent, while at the same time dividing the 80 percent, co-opting some into a hegemonic bloc and repressing the rest. Alongside the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression is heightened dissemination through the culture industries and corporate marketing strategies that depoliticize through consumerist fantasies and the manipulation of desire. As "Trumpism" in the United States so well illustrates, another strategy of co-optation is the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled toward scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Scapegoated communities are under siege, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Muslim minority in India, the Kurds in Turkey, southern African immigrants in South Africa, and Syrian and Iraqi refugees and other immigrants in Europe. As with its 20th century predecessor, 21st century fascism hinges on such manipulation of social anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend to projects of 21st century fascism. 2) The system is fast reaching the ecological limits to its reproduction. We have reached several tipping points in what environmental scientists refer to as nine crucial "planetary boundaries." We have already exceeded these boundaries in three areas -- climate change, the nitrogen cycle and diversity loss. There have been five previous mass extinctions in earth's history. While all these were due to natural causes, for the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system. We have entered what Paul Crutzen, the Dutch environmental scientist and Nobel Prize winner, termed the Anthropocene -- a new age in which humans have transformed up to half of the world's surface. We are altering the composition of the atmosphere and acidifying the oceans at a rate that undermines the conditions for life. The ecological dimensions of global crisis cannot be understated. "We are deciding, without quite meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will forever be closed," observes Elizabeth Kolbert in her best seller, The Sixth Extinction. "No other creature has ever managed this ... The Sixth Extinction will continue to determine the course of life long after everything people have written and painted and built has been ground into dust." Capitalism cannot be held solely responsible. The human-nature contradiction has deep roots in civilization itself. The ancient Sumerian empires, for example, collapsed after the population over-salinated their crop soil. The Mayan city-state network collapsed about AD 900 due to deforestation. And the former Soviet Union wrecked havoc on the environment. However, given capital's implacable impulse to accumulate profit and its accelerated commodification of nature, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system. "Green capitalism" appears as an oxymoron, as sadistic capitalism's attempt to turn the ecological crisis into a profit-making opportunity, along with the conversion of poverty into a tourist attraction. 3) The sheer magnitude of the means of violence is unprecedented, as is the concentrated control over the means of global communications and the production and circulation of knowledge, symbols and images. We have seen the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression that have brought us into the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control. This real-life Orwellian world is in a sense more perturbing than that described by George Orwell in his iconic novel 1984. In that fictional world, people were compelled to give their obedience to the state ("Big Brother") in exchange for a quiet existence with guarantees of employment, housing and other social necessities. Now, however, the corporate and political powers that be force obedience even as the means of survival are denied to the vast majority. Global apartheid involves the creation of "green zones" that are cordoned off in each locale around the world where elites are insulated through new systems of spatial reorganization, social control and policing. "Green zone" refers to the nearly impenetrable area in central Baghdad that US occupation forces established in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The command center of the occupation and select Iraqi elite inside that green zone were protected from the violence and chaos that engulfed the country. Urban areas around the world are now green zoned through gentrification, gated communities, surveillance systems, and state and private violence. Inside the world's green zones, privileged strata avail themselves of privatized social services, consumption and entertainment. They can work and communicate through internet and satellite sealed off under the protection of armies of soldiers, police and private security forces. Green zoning takes on distinct forms in each locality. In Palestine, I witnessed such zoning in the form of Israeli military checkpoints, Jewish settler-only roads and the apartheid wall. In Mexico City, the most exclusive residential areas in the upscale Santa Fe District are accessible only by helicopter and private gated roads. In Johannesburg, a surreal drive through the exclusive Sandton City area reveals rows of mansions that appear as military compounds, with private armed towers and electrical and barbed-wire fences. In Cairo, I toured satellite cities ringing the impoverished center and inner suburbs where the country's elite could live out their aspirations and fantasies. They sport gated residential complexes with spotless green lawns, private leisure and shopping centers and English-language international schools under the protection of military checkpoints and private security police. In other cities, green zoning is subtler but no less effective. In Los Angeles, where I live, the freeway system now has an express lane reserved for those that can pay an exorbitant toll. On this lane, the privileged speed by, while the rest remain one lane over, stuck in the city's notorious bumper-to-bumper traffic -- or even worse, in notoriously underfunded and underdeveloped public transportation, where it may take half a day to get to and from work. There is no barrier separating this express lane from the others. However, a near-invisible closed surveillance system monitors every movement. If a vehicle without authorization shifts into the exclusive lane, it is instantly recorded by this surveillance system and a heavy fine is imposed on the driver, under threat of impoundment, while freeway police patrols are ubiquitous. Outside of the global green zones, warfare and police containment have become normalized and sanitized for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. "Militainment" -- portraying and even glamorizing war and violence as entertaining spectacles through Hollywood films and television police shows, computer games and corporate "news" channels -- may be the epitome of sadistic capitalism. It desensitizes, bringing about complacency and indifference. In between the green zones and outright warfare are prison industrial complexes, immigrant and refugee repression and control systems, the criminalization of outcast communities and capitalist schooling. The omnipresent media and cultural apparatuses of the corporate economy, in particular, aim to colonize the mind -- to undermine the ability to think critically and outside the dominant worldview. A neofascist culture emerges through militarism, extreme masculinization, racism and racist mobilizations against scapegoats. 4) We are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism. Capitalism is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling the bicycle, you fall over. If the capitalist system stops expanding outward, it enters crisis and faces collapse. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion -- from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. Meanwhile, the privatization of education, health care, utilities, basic services and public land are turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital's control into "spaces of capital." Even poverty has been turned into a commodity. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? With the limits to expansion comes a turn toward militarized accumulation -- making wars of endless destruction and reconstruction and expanding the militarization of social and political institutions so as to continue to generate new opportunities for accumulation in the face of stagnation. 5) There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a "planet of slums," alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins and subject to these sophisticated systems of social control and destruction. Global capitalism has no direct use for surplus humanity. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of 21st century slavery possible. These systems include prison labor, the forced recruitment of miners at gunpoint by warlords contracted by global corporations to dig up valuable minerals in the Congo, sweatshops and exploited immigrant communities (including the rising tide of immigrant female caregivers for affluent populations). Furthermore, the global working class is experiencing accelerated "precariatization." The "new precariat" refers to the proletariat that faces capital under today's unstable and precarious labor relations -- informalization, casualization, part-time, temp, immigrant and contract labor. As communities are uprooted everywhere, there is a rising reserve army of immigrant labor. The global working class is becoming divided into citizen and immigrant workers. The latter are particularly attractive to transnational capital, as the lack of citizenship rights makes them particularly vulnerable, and therefore, exploitable. The challenge for dominant groups is how to contain the real and potential rebellion of surplus humanity, the immigrant workforce and the precariat. How can they contain the explosive contradictions of this system? The 21st century megacities become the battlegrounds between mass resistance movements and the new systems of mass repression. Some populations in these cities (and also in abandoned countryside) are at risk of genocide, such as those in Gaza, zones in Somalia and Congo, and swaths of Iraq and Syria. 6) There is a disjuncture between a globalizing economy and a nation-state-based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and do not wield enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose regulations on runaway transnational capital. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for instance, the governments of the G-8 and G-20 were unable to impose transnational regulation on the global financial system, despite a series of emergency summits to discuss such regulation. Elites historically have attempted to resolve the problems of over-accumulation by state policies that can regulate the anarchy of the market. However, in recent decades, transnational capital has broken free from the constraints imposed by the nation-state. The more "enlightened" elite representatives of the transnational capitalist class are now clamoring for transnational mechanisms of regulation that would allow the global ruling class to reign in the anarchy of the system in the interests of saving global capitalism from itself and from radical challenges from below. At the same time, the division of the world into some 200 competing nation-states is not the most propitious of circumstances for the global working class. Victories in popular struggles from below in any one country or region can (and often do) become diverted and even undone by the structural power of transnational capital and the direct political and military domination that this structural power affords the dominant groups. In Greece, for instance, the leftist Syriza party came to power in 2015 on the heels of militant worker struggles and a mass uprising. But the party abandoned its radical program as a result of the enormous pressure exerted on it from the European Central Bank and private international creditors. The Systemic Critique of Global Capitalism A growing number of transnational elites themselves now recognize that any resolution to the global crisis must involve redistribution downward of income. However, in the viewpoint of those from below, a neo-Keynesian redistribution within the prevailing corporate power structure is not enough. What is required is a redistribution of power downward and transformation toward a system in which social need trumps private profit. A global rebellion against the transnational capitalist class has spread since the financial collapse of 2008. Wherever one looks, there is popular, grassroots and leftist struggle, and the rise of new cultures of resistance: the Arab Spring; the resurgence of leftist politics in Greece, Spain and elsewhere in Europe; the tenacious resistance of Mexican social movements following the Ayotzinapa massacre of 2014; the favela uprising in Brazil against the government's World Cup and Olympic expulsion policies; the student strikes in Chile; the remarkable surge in the Chinese workers' movement; the shack dwellers and other poor people's campaigns in South Africa; Occupy Wall Street, the immigrant rights movement, Black Lives Matter, fast food workers' struggle and the mobilization around the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign in the United States. This global revolt is spread unevenly and faces many challenges. A number of these struggles, moreover, have suffered setbacks, such as the Greek working-class movement and, tragically, the Arab Spring. What type of a transformation is viable, and how do we achieve it? How we interpret the global crisis is itself a matter of vital importance as politics polarize worldwide between a neofascist and a popular response. The systemic critique of global capitalism must strive to influence, from this vantage point, the discourse and practice of movements for a more just distribution of wealth and power. Our survival may depend on it.

#### The alternative is to build solidarity around a mass socialist movement.

Dudzic & Reed 15 (Mark - National Organizer and Chairman of the United States Labor Party & Adolph - professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, “THE CRISIS OF LABOUR AND THE LEFT IN THE UNITED STATES,” p. 364-367, *Socialist Register*)

This does not mean that those who embrace a transformative vision must abandon all hope. Rather, the priorities, activities and resources of those who would rebuild a real left must be informed by this strategic sensibility. Building or rebuilding an effective left presence will be quite likely a decades-long process. This means that we are not well served by clambering after the Next Big Thing. We must start by excising the impulse – quite understandable for a political movement devoid of any real agency – toward utopian dreaming and wishful thinking. The spark will not ignite the prairie fire. Nor will the Ark float on its own account no matter how carefully we construct it. Recognizing the left’s political irrelevance can be emancipating, as it reduces the sense of urgency to try to mobilize around every one of neoliberalism’s daily outrages. That should provide space for serious strategic discussion of how to begin to build a mass socialist movement based in the working class and the creation of new institutions capable of mobilizing cross-class solidarity, as Sam Gindin has articulated in a particularly clear and compelling way.25 Certainly, the US left could benefit from a nonsectarian, organized force with a coherent strategic vision and programme. The absence of a disciplined, unified and sophisticated group of cadre is a major source of the left’s incoherence, and helps explain why moments of spontaneous political upsurge have had, at best, an episodic impact and remain unconnected to similar moments in the past – even those in which the same activists have participated. Such organization, however, cannot be created in a vacuum. It can only emerge in tandem with a growing working-class movement. We fear that in the specific context of US history and practice, the socialist project is too narrow a platform from which to launch a broad and far ranging left revitalization. Socialist practice in the US has become the domain of sectarian groups that drive away working-class support, and socialist consciousness has not embedded itself in any significant sections of the working class or a left capable of exercising social power. That failing reflects the cultural and ideological triumph of neoliberalism and the identitarian ideologies and programmes that serve as its left wing. In this environment, building socialism is exclusively a project of cadre development, albeit one that cannot hope to succeed apart from broader movement-building. Broad movement-building requires mobilizing around an agenda of substantively anti-capitalist reforms that directly and militantly assert the priority of social needs over market forces, bourgeois property rights and managerial prerogative in the workplace and production process. Struggles to preserve and expand public institutions and to decommoditize basic human needs like housing, transportation, healthcare and education could begin to address the immediate challenge, which is to create a new popular constituency for a revitalized movement, instead of reorganizing or re-mobilizing an already existing but totally marginalized left.26 Some question whether the current US labour movement is too narrow a platform on which to rebuild a left. In a widely circulated article, ‘Fortress Unionism’, Rich Yeselson correctly highlights the atrophy of the labour movement and shows how its decline began with the passage of the TaftHartley Act in 1947. He contends that labour’s ‘current institutional expression cannot, via a creative conceptual breakthrough (“tactics or broader strategy”), engender a vast growth in union strength comparable to its former peak. In short, “organized labor” can no longer create a space for workers to join their organizations by the millions’.27 In grim statistical detail, Jake Rosenfeld’s What Unions No Longer Do gives fuel to this thesis. He points out that despite decades of exemplary, heroic and pioneering organizing by Justice for Janitors in the immigrant community, ‘Today only one in seven Hispanic janitors in the United States belongs to a union, down from one in five back in 1988, when Justice for Janitors began’.28 Yeselson calls for a ‘fortress unionism’ that would ‘defend the remaining high-density regions, sectors and companies’ and then ‘Wait for the workers to say they have had enough. When they demand in vast numbers collective solutions to their problems, seize upon that energy and institutionalize it.’29 This approach correctly identifies the urgent need to preserve the remnants of the current labour movement as an institutional base upon which to build a future revitalized movement. And it also correctly points out the haplessness of willy-nilly organizing schemes that do little to build power for working people while exposing their best leaders in unorganized workplaces to massive employer retaliation without any ability to defend them. But a strategy of waiting for workers to say they have had enough ultimately relies on magical thinking not unlike that of isolated Japanese soldiers scattered on island outposts at the end of the Second World War waiting for reinforcements from a defeated empire. Many of Yeselson’s critics, however, are equally quixotic. Bruce Raynor and Andy Stern, two of the most cynical practitioners of a unionism that disempowers workers and is based on a model of global class collaboration, point out that the ‘fortress’ strategy will do little to reduce inequality. Instead, they place their hopes in ‘strategic alliances with willing employers’; in unions developing value-added services to complement human resource departments; and in leveraging union and public-sector pension funds to rebuild union density.30 This strategy would liquidate the very concept of an independent labour movement. Given its decimation and marginalization, any revitalization movement would need to be built from a base that is far broader than the current institutional labour movement. A revitalized labour movement will have to embrace new organizational forms and some of the models emerging from new labour organizing show significant potential. Some are driven by necessity as the legal status of many immigrants and of workers in industries such as trucking, taxi driving and residential construction make organizing under current labour law virtually illegal. Much of this new organizing is being done by Worker Centers with heavy foundation funding and has the character of social work along the settlement house model of the early twentieth century. Much of it seems also, more or less openly, to fold class analysis into identitarian discourses that both substitute moralizing for political critique and fit comfortably within the NGO model. Such impulses, as well as the popularity of neologism, underlie arguments that current conditions have generated a new social formation, a ‘precariat’ that lies outside the traditional capitalist class structure.31 But some associated with this category have begun to evolve into substantial, self-conscious worker-run organizations. The Taxi Workers Alliance grew from a small New York City advocacy group to become a national organization (whose members are classified as ‘independent contractors’ and thus ineligible for union representation under US labour law) and was recently admitted to the AFL-CIO.32 In Vermont and elsewhere, strategic Workers Centers have built organic alliances with the labour movement and gone on to lead significant campaigns for healthcare for all, paid sick days and economic justice through the mobilization of a working-class constituency.33 Some argue that these campaigns and projects have the capacity to coalesce into geographically based class-conscious organizations and have called for the building of worker assemblies to give voice to this new movement.34 Such an effort would require a level of ideological sophistication and institutional independence that does not currently exist. Attempts to establish these structures on the ground have been premature and could actually inhibit the kind of broad, class-based organizing that inspires this movement in much the same way that many Labor Party chapters became captured by an ‘activistist’ mentality that focused more on preaching to the converted than building a constituency, while driving away real working-class voices who represented something more than themselves. New models are most successful when they can leverage existing organization and power to build outwards into new organization. Recent experiences organizing healthcare and homecare workers, hotel and casino workers and building services employees are fruitful examples of smart and strategic organizing that have leveraged existing union relationships and/ or political opportunities to build power for working people. We also look to the logistics organizing campaigns – which focus on the chokepoints of global capitalism and build on existing union power on the docks and other shipping centres – as having the potential to develop a particularly powerful form of a strategic union presence in economic sectors at the very core of contemporary capitalism.35

## ON

### 1NC---AT: Solvency

#### Totalizing refusal is self-defeating at best and gets coopted by fascism at worst—material and technical engagement with political institutions is the solution to violent individuation.

Gironi and Negarestani, 18—IRC Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the School of Philosophy, University College Dublin AND Iranian philosopher (Fabio and Reza, “ENGINEERING THE WORLD, CRAFTING THE MIND,” <https://www.neroeditions.com/docs/reza-negarestani-engineering-the-world-crafting-the-mind/>, dml)

(2) The second objection might come from a communitarian perspective: surely we can build a world sealed off from the pathological systems that plague this planet. I counter this claim by saying that this supposed world is built on two presuppositions: (a) You are implicitly endorsing a metaphysical totality in which everything that is going on in this world of ours has been assimilated by a pathological system (e.g., Capitalism) but this totality is only an illusion which you have chosen to take for reality; (b) your commune in fact parasitizes on the affordances provided by our world. The alleged purity of your thoughts and actions is actually made possible by the pathologies from which you think you have diverged. Your commune is not a solution but only another anonymous contribution to the status quo.

(3) The third objection comes from the neoreactionary doctrine: the whole pursuit of universalism is misguided, for we are particular individuals so entrenched in the particularities of our experiences and ideologies that any recipe for universalism is nothing more than a fable for naive ideologues. My retort to this third objection is: ok, let us believe that universalism, hegemony-construction and consensus-building are just the logics of illusion. But surely your neoreactionary island requires a certain labor to integrate the like-minded individuals. In this process, you have assumed that doctrinal preferences trump over individual preferences, but you are sadly mistaken. For even in your neoreactionary island, you should deal with the problems of hegemony and consensus, albeit in a restricted scope. It is not that your idea of universalism is naïve—even though it really is but rather that you cannot even fathom the scope of particularities. Even in the case of people subscribing to the same agenda, we are always the creatures of our own particular experiences.

Now, an advocate of neoreaction might object that the institution of such islands does not require any form of unified ideology or consensus-building. Biorealism, or cybernetic circuitry of capitalism and untethered economic competition, can effectively consolidate those who have enlisted for neoractionary experimentations. But again, what is missing in such scenarios is a deeper understanding of the scope of human experiential particularities as dynamic perturbations of the system. Over time, even minor disturbances will have cumulative effects which, if not attended to in a context-sensitive manner, are guaranteed to throw the entire system into disarray. As for biorealist schemas, even if they were more than unscientific and dogmatic fantasies about nature—which they aren’t—that could consolidate and orient populations at an accelerated rate in the fashion depicted by Theodore Sturgeon in his story Microcosmic God: they will be still impinged upon by norms and personal desires of individuals. Not to mention, that the apt metaphor for natural selection is nature as a slow tinkerer rather than a great accelerator. What I would say to my neoreactionary friends is that to the extent that they do not take seriously the depths of incommensurable experiences, their island will eventually sink. For they think that in the Hobbesian game-theoretic jungle, all you need to do is to ward off enemies and make islands for those who believe in the same social experimentations. But as time passes, the Hobbes Inferno will exact its revenge upon you. Without an adequate understanding of particularities even when a common ideology or a so-called universal method of pruning is at stake, you will end up not just devouring your enemies but also eating your kin alive.

(4) The final objection comes from various fatalist doctrines, particularly, the doctrine of anti-praxis with its slogan “let it go.” First of all, I think anti-praxis attempts to present itself as a zero-claim ideology, one that has no claim, no practical norm, and no recipe for collective political action. In this sense, one can get the impression that perhaps anti-praxis is more genuine than the other tenets I listed above, in so far as it does not deceive you with lofty promises of salvation, emancipation or the great outdoors. It is what it is and stands in sharp contrast to the illusions of collective political action. However, such an impression is fundamentally credulous. There is no such a thing as a zero-claim doctrine. If we look at the early doctrine of fascism—particularly its Italian offshoot—we realize that this is precisely how fascism took root. It began with the claim that we indeed have no claim, no recipe because all recipes are oppressive.

This is not to equate anti-praxis with fascism but to simply point out that a zero-claim doctrine—one that sees all practical norms as oppressive—is rife for fascist appropriation. When the proponents of anti-praxis tell us that they have no political norm or recipe, we should look at them with utter suspicion. They are either trying in the worst case to dissimulate their ulterior motives under the rubric of ideological innocence or, in the best case, they are not conscious of their own implicit practical norms because they have already dispensed with the responsibility, authority, presuppositions, and implications involved in consuming and producing norms. Saying that we must abandon all practical norms is already a normative recipe to the extent that is predicated on the impermissibility—i.e. what we ought not do—of practical norms. In this sense, anti-praxis is just a false consciousness of its so-called lack of normativity or purported innocence.

Therefore, either anti-praxis is an implicit normative recipe or it is not. If it is, then it is not really anti-praxis, and it means that it is unaware of its own normative and/or practical assumptions. If it is not normatively practical, then it must be a theoretical position and as such it is predicated upon theoretical norms such as the knowledge of the current state of affairs, and thus beholden to epistemological norms of attaining the knowledge of the current situation. In other words, how do we know that the current state of affairs is thus-and-so? Either we have a procedure of determination that is in accordance with the public norms of doing theory, epistemology, etc, or it is the case that anti-praxis assumes we do not follow norms of theory (which are fundamentally entangled with norms of practical reasoning). In the latter case, anti-praxis is just another variation of the myth of the given and/or private access to reality. Or, maybe it is the case that anti-praxis is not even a theoretical position. In that case, it should be an aesthetic position. But if that is the case, it then has no purchase on the knowledge of the state of affairs on which it is built, nor does it have any saying as to what ought to be done and what ought not, even doing nothing. We should realize that doing nothing is itself a practical norm to the extent that we can only say “do nothing” insofar as we assume we ought not do such and such things. I would say anti-praxis is more like a new age monotheistic religion that prohibitively feeds off of practical norms of other religions, all to present itself as the last religion you should embrace.

So, in a nutshell, the first concrete recipe of universalism is the realization of our world: the real world is not a division between us and them, but a trap or enigma in which we are all ensnared. Aiming towards the construction a better world, entails seeking more computational resources. To see an enemy as an enemy is the first unwise strategy. The enemy is he or she who gives us a perspective otherwise unavailable to our intuitive or so-called immediate experience of the world. The abolishment of our pathological particular traits can only start when we diagnose what these particularities are and strive to change them by global or universal conditions.

Fabio Gironi: Let us move deeper into a more explicit political register. Some of your comments above regarding universalism and its detractors remind me of the “first law” of what the late Mark Fisher infamously called the “Vampire Castle,” i.e. the priestly, resentment-ridden left-wing intelligentsia. As he put it: “the first law of the Vampires’ Castle is: individualise and privatise everything. While in theory it claims to be in favour of structural critique, in practice it never focuses on anything except individual behaviour”. Similarly, your polemic against communitarianism and particularism, and against an understanding of the “local” as terminal horizon rather than as synthetic step for the piecemeal construction of a global framework seems in broad agreement with those political-economic stances that in recent years have been assimilated under the banner of accelerationism (as most concretely expounded in Srnicek’s and Williams’ Inventing the Future). I know that you were a friend of Fisher, and that you know Srnicek and Williams well, but can you offer me a clear description of your political stance, in relation to this broad orthodoxy-breaking and future-oriented trend in leftist thinking? Do you have any prescriptive stance regarding political action?

Reza Negarestani: I’m afraid that my political stance—or rather my philosophical view concerning what ought to be done in the arena of politics—oscillates between deep pessimism regarding our methods and optimism about future possibilities. Yet, insofar as any possibility can only be actualized by adequate and malleable methods and tools, and to the extent that our methods, ways of systematization, intervention with socio-economic reality and so on are either quite rudimentary or disoriented with regard to the realization of consequential political changes, I think I am more comfortable to identify myself as a rational pessimist. I reject passive pessimism in the sense that as long as possibilities can be imagined, we have to actively gamble and push beyond any vestige of resignation. Without imagining possibilities and piecewise attempts at actualizing them, there is in fact no good justification for surviving as a species. As Seneca has pointed out, in complete absence of such a struggle, we must perhaps devise the most cunning and artful contrivance for bringing our death about. In that case, even the slogan “let it go,” once inflated, is nothing but a disingenuous pessimism that attempts to fabricate a semblance of profundity. In reality, it is the very exemplification of human conservatism and an adolescent disgruntlement which secretly hopes for a miraculous change even when it tries to seem detached from such concerns. After all, romantic fatalism is the shallowest form of passive optimism, rather than genuine pessimism.

Other than the question of methods and tools, another reason for my doubt is what I mentioned in my answer to your previous question and which you brought up through Mark. It is the enigma of the particular. It is enigmatic precisely because the particular as a real condition can shapeshift and come in different guises, play different even contradictory roles in the domains of both the individual and the collective, the local and the universal piecewise integration and mobilization of localities. Mark was one of the best critics of the Hobbesian myth of the state as that which guards the human from their complete transformation into wolves, as that without which humanity is inconceivable. In a sense, Mark was far more radical than Hobbes in that he fathomed the depth of the enigma of the particular. The particular can be pernicious or even illusory through and through. The absolutization of the particular, the individuals—whether in the name of the victim, the sufferer or in the name of individual choices and preferences—completely misses the fact that the conditions of individuation can themselves be pathological. The overemphasis on the particular or the local, accordingly, can very well the blind perpetuation of the conditions of exploitation and misery. But particulars can also be positively non-trivial and implicitly collective perspectives: by making these perspectives explicit, we can shed light onto the problems of the individual and the collective. However, one thing is certain—as Mark would have agreed—the depth of particularities is inexhaustible. So much that, as I argued earlier, even those who dismiss the universalist labour have to deal with its drastic implication within their neo-reactionary floating islands. Absent a diagnosis of different kind of particularities, and short of analysing them with regard to the mechanisms responsible for generating and distinguishing such causal factors or mechanisms at different levels of socio-economic reality, we are all—and I mean everyone—on the same Hobbesian Raft of the Medusa. We will eventually betray ourselves and eat one another, irrespective of whether we think we should strive for a future universalist collective project, we should denounce such endeavours, or we should do nothing and just let it go.

Given the endless series of particularities, of individuals, and of localities, as well as their protean nature, I think that—given our current tools, modes of thinking and action, methods, etc.—we have at this point a very slim, if any at all, chance to do anything that leads us beyond the nightmare of this auto-cannibalistic raft. While I wholeheartedly support the paradigms raised by people like Patricia Reed, Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams which are focused on consensus-building, hegemony-construction and the critical integration of particularities of the human condition, I think as a philosopher I should take side with the Socratic method of the courage of truth with regard to the political action. And as such, I believe the prospects are now very dim, shockingly so. This claim should not incite the cheer of the right-inclined, resignatory, neo-reactionary, and conservative thinkers. If anything, it should lead them to confront the prospects of their own reality as well in terms of a pure terror, insofar as this dim prospect is not exclusive to the emancipatory politics to which we have subscribed but also includes their recipes or the lack thereof.

This brings me to the main question you raised regarding my political stance. I think this question is predicated on the assumption that we can define our political position by rummaging through and resorting to the concretely instantiated political paradigms which have already been realized and then choose one that fits our methodological and ideal ambitions. I really fail to see such an exemplification that I can hold to or define as my political position. One should engage a great feat of self-deception to see contemporary political paradigms as adequate to respond the existing tribulations and problems. Sure, I am a leftist who believes in the reality of the class struggle, but this is not really a political position, only a consciousness of the socio-economic reality. I take seriously Marx and Engels’s thesis that communism “is not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality (will) have to adjust itself. Communism is the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.” This is what I would call—again following Mark—the possibility of actualizing that which is possible but from our perspective, here and now, seem impossible. For me the task of politics in conjunction with the support of philosophy and technoscience is to not only show—in theory and in collective imagination—that the reality of our world is neither inevitable nor a completed totality, but also manages to concretely build a new world from whose perspective our reality will be exposed as the illusion of the inexorable and finality. But then again, even this, is not a clear-cut political position. It is merely a philosophical thesis on the possibility of a different world and the range of political actions that can fully actualize it.

Fabio Gironi: You merge this rational pessimism with the “engineering approach” for the construction of a better world, as you explained before. To some, this paradigm of political action will sound like you are vouching for a dispassionate and formalist approach to politics, and a government of experts—a “technocracy,” something that in recent times has become anathema in most public discussion (but that, the critic might enjoy pointing out, has been proven to be a failure at least since Plato’s political misadventure in Syracuse)—or even for a nefarious kind of “social engineering.” I suspect that in large part this depends precisely on am equivocation about the very concept of “engineering.” In our folk understanding “engineers,” broadly conceived, are often considered too naive to deal with the intricacies of politics, a domain fraught with normative considerations.

But if I am not mistaken, your expert engineer is as much a technically-minded problem-solver as it is a creative conceptual builder: a figure that applies his or her intelligence to the resolution of problems by means of more than the unilateral application of simple formulas or pre-packaged precepts. Indeed, it seems to me that this is where many contemporary ideas converge. Srnicek’s and Willams’ proposal to “move beyond folk politics and create a new hegemony” and their insistence on the practical/political concept of “repurposing.” Ben Singleton’s reflection on cunning reason (metis) as employed for the strategic and piecemeal construction of freedom from constraints. And of course, your own “speculative inquiry into the future of intelligence,” or functional reconceptualization of intelligence as an emancipatory tool of self- and collective improvement—as well as for practical action upon the world—where conception and transformation are two sides of the same coin. Is it then correct to say the concept of “engineering” (rather different from its “folk” equivalent) is at the core of both your philosophical and political thinking?

Reza Negarestani: Among computer scientists, there is this joke: when computer scientists go into a room full of political theorists, philosophers, cultural critics and linguists, they say to each other, “get rid of all of them and replace them with engineers.” Well, perhaps this joke is a bit too much but it has a grain of truth. Neither philosophers nor political theorists are able to design proper methods adequate to actualize possibilities, imagined or not. We need politically and philosophically informed engineers and designers. Engineers are indeed not mindless technicians, they are people who have one foot in the domain of thinking and one in the realm of an external reality or worldly affairs. They do not see action as a form of hubristic mastery to the extent that they know whatever we do at any level of reality—be it natural, social or cultural—will meet the resistance of that reality. To use a Sellarsian metaphor, reality in the broadest possible sense is not a block of wax ready to be imprinted. Engineers truly know that. They also never see reality in any sense as a flat universe, they see it as vast and deeply multi-scaled structure. In order to concretely intervene at any level of reality we must not only have a multi-level view of the reality but also know which methods, models or tools should be implemented, and at which level. To cut at the joints without splintering the bones is a description of what engineers—as Plato’s good butchers—do.

There are at least two other important tasks which are deeply entangled with the discipline and philosophy of engineering. One is the labour of modelling and the other, the design of approximation techniques. Michael Weisberg has recently written a wonderful book on models and modelling, a topic which in the past was not being taken seriously but was central to engineering. Weisberg elaborates why all our encounters with reality involve one or another kind of model, for example, descriptive, explanatory and predictive models. Even what we call empirical data are not ready-made, they are products of model projection, which means data can be distorted or even false data may be derived if the model is inadequate, too small or too big, misapplied to a target system or applied to a wrong sector of reality. The thing about models is that they are packed with all sorts of implicit and explicit theoretical, mathematical, logical and computational assumptions. Such assumptions encompass not just the model’s description but also the core of the model i.e. the structure and its interpretive factors or construals which include information about the scope, assignment, and fidelity criteria of the model itself. The latter criteria pertain to the exact information which specify the model’s representational, dynamic and resolution constraints for a given level or scale. Without proper attention to such details and the assumptions underlying them, all data and facts can be fundamentally distorted or erroneous. The whole myth of raw or pure data is perpetuated by people who have no clue about how data is mined—irrespective of what kind of data we are talking about.

The other task, the design of approximation techniques, is even trickier. Mark Wilson sums up the nature of the approximation techniques in his new book, Physics Avoidance. Engineers—like Ben Singleton’s designers as embodiments of metis or cunning intelligence—are adept at trickery, hacking the system and reality. They know that it is not the best solution to modify a given target system by intervening with lower levels or fine-grained scales (like for example, the atomic scale-length of a metal beam). Intervention at such bottom levels is rife for what Wilson calls computational hazards, due to extreme fine-grained details of lower levels, any attempt at modification and intervention will either fail or become sub-optimal. Not to mention that we often lack any solid grasp of lower level mechanisms, sometimes we don’t even have any indication as what these fine-grained scales are, we can only postulate them. So what engineers do is first they model scales or levels pertaining to the structure of the target system or the phenomenon in question. Such modelling always involves a controlled amount of simplification and/or idealization which can at a later time be revised or equipped with more details. Then, they think of how to carefully bridge lower levels to upper levels where the structure is less fine-grained and more accessible and more hospitable to intervention and modification. These bridges—which are essentially mixed-level in that they contain information regarding middle scales between the bottom and the top—are called approximation techniques. These are procedures by which engineers circumvent the messy problems of physics without forgetting about them. Such techniques allow engineers to modify a given system optimally without always the need to deal with all sorts of details which make intervention fundamentally impractical from an applied perspective, from the computational cost standpoint, etc.

Here, however, a problem arises that André Carus, in his critique of Wilson’s work, has elaborated with the utmost lucidity. What is this problem? It is the idea that engineering conceived this way would be anti-Enlightenment in the sense that all we can ever do is to reform our local concepts and descriptive pragmatic resources in a piecemeal manner, without hoping to achieve unification. We can no longer have ambitious concepts that can be applied across the board—those global concepts treasured by philosophers such as the Copernican imperative, reason, freedom, etc. Our situation is similar to that of a child who plays in the tub and is in command of a rubber duck. But, of course, the picture of reality is more like that a river where torrential flows, undertows, and chaotic behaviours take hold of the rubber duck. In order to make sure this rubber duck sails in the river, we can no longer adopt a global concept of sail or navigation. We should have atlases of local theory façades which are responsive to such turbulent quandaries. And of course, to conform to such a picture of reality, we can only develop local concepts and heuristic norms which are informational packages that reflect varying and non-unifiable perspectives such as the concept of hardness—as for example applied to a metal beam—which fundamentally varies across different scale-lengths of the metal structure.

While I have a sympathy for such view, I believe Carus is right. Our encounters with reality are not merely such heuristic or pragmatic devices. Engineers always have a main solution—a global concept—in mind. Then they try to bring various real-time scenarios under it such that neither the global concept nor local pragmatic concepts are mutually exclusive but are rather mutually positively constraining and self-reinforcing. Engineering, in this sense, is about the commensuration of the local and the global, the ideal and the messy, the strategic and the tactical. Engineering, therefore, incorporates two senses of the Enlightenment’s rational reconstruction of the world or—to use Carnap’s later term—explication. One in the sense of realism and one in the sense of idealism, naturalism and constructivism. To reengineer and recognize reality, one can neither adopt a universal concept or paradigm nor just local and perspectival concepts. Both the overarching paradigm and local malleable solution are needed.

Now, as you asked, how do we adapt this engineering paradigm to politics? My friend Ray (Brassier) cautioned me regarding this unconditional espousal of engineering as a political method. I fully agree with him. Politics fundamentally differs from engineering from the perspective of norms of political action. The philosophically and politically informed engineering as a political method is predicated on the hard labour of politics which, to a great degree, consists of diagnosing our current situation and then deciding how should we move forward, the work necessary for arriving the global concept. However, I do disagree with the idea that unlike the realm of politics where “what ought to be done” is a matter of antagonism and consensus-building, engineering is centred on a pre-established conventional norm (i.e., this is what the system should do, or this is the agreed upon norm by which the system should behave). Even in engineering, we know that the system can have multiple diverging trajectories of evolution. There is no pre-established norm or consensus as what the system is and how it should behave. For engineers, there is no pre-established function of a given system since such functions do change over time and in accordance with local contexts. Modelling a system is as daunting a task for engineers as it is for political theorists and activists to diagnose pathologies of society, and to find a way to eliminate them. Reality is not a given totality: sometimes you should approach it as a black box that can only be unveiled by systematically playing or intervening with it. Other times, you should do the hard work of modelling under epistemological constraints. All in all, the task is to integrate global concepts with contrasting local concepts.

So yes, in response to your question I take the paradigm of engineering as a profoundly composite—epistemological and practical—way of thinking about the world. And this also leads me to finally answer the question you posed earlier regarding what can be the concrete way of getting political ambitions done. Our first step in a concrete political project should be focused on diagnosing the precise causal mechanism responsible for the pathologies of individuation, to detect the levels at which such mechanism are entrenched, and then proceed to develop tools to intervene at those exact levels—like an engineer. If you don’t have the adequate tools to intervene at that level, then devise approximation techniques, resolve the problem at a different level. And, again like an engineer, attempt to lay out the logic(s) of existing worlds at different scales. Make new tools to construct new worlds from the detritus of the old one. The new different world is not a miracle or a religious afterlife, it is a world engineered from what is available to us. To recapitulate, we need to first understand the plural logics of this world almost like the multi-level ontologies of information science to even think what ought to be done and decide exactly what methods or tools at what level should be exercised.

#### Refusal is only important insofar as it is generative---transforming social relations requires concrete action targetting intersections of systems of oppression

**Davis et al. 17**. Lynne Davis, Associate Professor, Indigenous Studies, Trent University; Jeff Dennis, Associate Professor, Sociology McMaster University; Raven Sinclair, Associate Professor, Social Work University of Regina. “Pathways of settler decolonization.” Settler Colonial Studies 7(4): 393-7.

In addition to interdisciplinarity, the papers also share a concern to move from analysis toward action. Scholars such as Macoun and Strakosch,1 and Snelgrove, Dhamoon and Corntassel2 have warned against an abdication of responsibility by settler activists because the structural nature of settler colonialism would seem to defy a transformed future. In assessing the strengths and limitations of settler colonial theory, Macoun and Strakosch challenge those who use settler colonial theory (SCT) to realize its transformative opportunities while acting consciously to counter limitations identified by various critics. They caution against a stance of inevitability of settler colonialism that would risk delegitimizing Indigenous resistance, and they worry about re-inscribing settler academics’ political and intellectual authority to the detriment of Indigenous voices. At the same time, they note the contribution of SCT in providing a theoretical language to understand colonialism as a continuing force in the present, including an analysis of how both conservative and progressive settler movements may detract from Indigenous political challenges to the state, thus problematizing settler efforts at reconciliation and decolonization. They identify as one of its strengths the ability of SCT to provide non-Indigenous people with ‘a better account of ourselves’, 3 and to generate new conversations and alliances between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. Snelgrove, Dhamoon and Corntassel warn that SCT’s rapid ascendancy in the academy could overshadow Indigenous Studies and the voices of Indigenous peoples. They argue that: without centering Indigenous peoples’ articulations, without deploying a relational approach to settler colonial power, and without paying attention to the conditions and contingencies of settler colonialism, studies of settler colonialism and practices of solidarity run the risk of reifying (and possibly replicating) settler colonial as well as other modes of domination.4 In their view, Indigenous resistance and resurgence must remain central in discussions of changing relationships: Theorists of Indigenous resurgence, such as Taiaiake Alfred and Leanne Simpson, among others, also express the possibility for settler society listening, learning, and acting […] in accordance with and for what is being articulated [by Indigenous people]; Indigenous resurgence is ultimately about reframing the conversation around decolonization in order to re-center and reinvigorate Indigenous nationhood. Macoun and Strakosch, and Snelgrove, Dhamoon and Corntassel gesture towards action by settler society to follow the lead of resurgence theorists in transforming settler colonialism, despite the structural, relational and affective challenges of anti-colonial struggle, in order to ‘reinvigorate Indigenous nationhood’ The authors in this volume examine pathways to settler decolonization, analyzing the uneven terrain of settler efforts and experiences through the lenses of SCT, Indigenous scholars and grassroots communities, and specific disciplinary analyses. While SCT has been criticized for its inability to theorize a decolonial future, this volume interrogates what happens when settlers engage with and seek to transform the system. What does such action look like? What challenges, complexities and barriers are faced? What are the stumbling blocks? And what opportunities and possibilities emerge? The articles in this volume all note the need for settlers to transform our/their relations with the land and with Indigenous peoples, while recognizing the structural and psychological challenges of applying these principles in practice. It is one thing to care about the environment, and quite another to reorient one’s lifestyle around sustainable practices and the health of local ecosystems. It is one thing to feel a connection to a place, and another to accept the notion of ‘non-human agency’. 6 Likewise, it is easier for settlers to advocate for the return of land to Indigenous peoples ‘over there’ rather than right where settlers and settler states and corporations (claim to) own property.7 Transforming social relations is not just a matter of befriending Indigenous people; it means developing long-term relations of accountability, engaging in meaningful dialogue, and respecting Indigenous laws and jurisdiction. Learning to transform relationships in these ways – and to transform self-understandings and thinking and feeling patterns or ‘settler common sense’ 8 – is an ongoing process; it is not linear, but rather iterative, occurring in what Hiller in this volume calls ‘upward and downward spirals’. Moreover, settlers’ anti-colonial learning (and unlearning) does not simply precede action; it occurs through action, through meaningful relationships with Indigenous peoples and with other engaged settlers, and through experimentation with activism of various sorts. The Nehiyawak (Cree) refer to this relational and iterative social justice-focused process as kisāhkīwewin: love in action. Several papers in this volume also address the role of emotions in settler decolonization. While critical self-reflection is essential to this process, and while emotions such as guilt, shame and indignation can help motivate settlers to change their ways and support Indigenous resurgence (as Bacon shows in one of the articles collected here), it is equally important not to treat ‘unsettling the settler within’ 9 as an end in itself; rather than dwelling in discomfort, the point of unsettlement is to be a springboard to action that benefits Indigenous peoples. A related point of tension (or contention) is whether decolonization is in the interests of settlers. Boudreau (in this volume) argues that deep decolonizing solidarities must not be based on self-interest; decolonization for settlers entails sacrifice, or giving up power and privilege. This may be true and, therefore, if it is believed that there is nothing in it for settlers, why would they ever pursue it? Although decolonization may not be in settlers’ short-term economic or political interests, it may fulfill a humanistic, ethical and moral commitment. Moreover, decolonization may be in virtually everyone’s long-term interest, particularly if Indigenous resurgence assists in combatting climate change, ever-growing economic inequality, and other political and social problems. As Tuck and Yang make clear, decolonization is not a metaphor for other social justice projects.10 Nevertheless, settler colonialism does intersect with other systems of oppression, and decolonization would be incomplete without also tackling racism, capitalism and heterosexism.11

#### Rethinking thinking fails

**Zack 16**—Professor of Philosophy, University of Oregon (Naomi, “Discourse, Prophecy, and Atmosphere,” *Applicative Justice: A Pragmatic Empirical Approach to Racial Injustice*, Chapter 5, 125-128, dml)

Just law can coexist with unjust practice and both are parts of “empirical law” or what Bendey called “the process of government.” Empirical law is constantly changing and some theorists are optimistic that verbal discourse has the ability to make written law more just, even though the same unjust practices recur or new ones emerge. These theorists, some of whom are or may aspire to become public intellectuals, hope that someday public political discourse on behalf of those who are treated unjustly will have the power to interrupt a cycle of just written law accompanied by continued unjust practice. That is, the “right” discourse perennially holds the promise of changing the beliefs, values, and goals of everyone in the public auditorium, so that the same kind of unjust practices do not perpetually chase the same kinds of just laws.11 This search for “magic words” is futile for academics who are professionally confined to dry and abstract prose. Our verbiage does not have the power to move the multitudes who do not read or listen to it anyway. But even when multitudes are inspired and emotionally stirred by great orators, action that follows is unlikely to result in lasting change, without the support of powerful interests.

After the 1960s, academics began a robust practice of liberatory discourse about injustice that seems to grow more impassioned and intense each year. The quest for demographic diversity among students and faculty in higher education has weathered judicial defeat of explicit affirmative action policies, but only partly for the sake of justice. There are pragmatic prizes if the academy can justify itself by producing a racially integrated leadership and managerial class for business, politics, and the military. Top leaders throughout society realize that they need such racial diversity for broad consumption, voter support, and boots on the ground, and the expression of that need is evident in amicus curiae briefs submitted to the US Supreme Court as it has been torturously dismantling affirmative action, piece by piece, since Bakke in 1978.12 Academic political discourse has been deeper than polemics and debate, exactly because of its disciplined intellectual origins in different fields of study (i.e., discipline imposed by distinct “disciplines”). But it has been swimming upstream against a more rarefied and older academic tradition, particularly among many philosophers and their gate keepers outside of the profession. Even Hannah Arendt (see chapter 2) spoke approvingly of the life of the mind as cut off from real political activity that occurred in the realm of “opinion.” In her 1970 interview with Adelbert Reif, Arendt addressed the phenomenon of college-stu-dent protestors, noting that they had brought social change through optimistic belief in their ability to make a better world, while at the same time discovering joy in civic participation. Arendt credited such protests with the success of the civil rights movement and progress toward ending the Vietnam War.13 As discussed in chapter 4, it is doubtful that Arendt was correct that student protests caused the success of the civil rights movement. A historical analysis of the end to the Vietnam War is beyond the present scope, but what we already know about empirical Bentleyan analyses would warrant skepticism about Arendt’s causal thesis there as well. In the same interview, Arendt warned that demonstrations by student activists could be self-defeating in democratic Euro-American contexts, because in attacking their universities, they were attacking the very entities that made their protests possible, American universities, especially large state schools that were the sites of the protests Arendt had in mind, have perforce developed very different financial structures since 1970. These schools have become increasingly dependent on private corporate and philanthropic funding, with state government funds now a much reduced part of their budget. While this structural change is not generally viewed as an incursion on academic freedom, it has been coincident with a very flat era of student protest and activism. Still, Arendt's notion of the "life of the mind” remains useful if we consider that the progressive/change-seeking output of professional academics since 1970 has been professionally accepted in the institutions that employ its participants. Also, much of today’s liberatory academic discourse can be viewed as the legacy of earlier student protest, furthering a tradition that may have been founded when some of the 1960s student radicals became professors. This indicates that the connection between academic radicals and the hands that feed them is not as simple as Arendt thought. In the United States, everything now points to both the existence of real academic freedom and its real ineffectiveness.

Progressive academic writers ply a craft of formal speech that deals with contemporary injustice through complex theoretical frameworks, with requisite scholarly apparatuses and without translation into more simple views of the world; there is often also a lack of translation from one discipline to another or between subdisciplines in the same field. The audience is other academics and students. Neither specialization nor the limited and partly captive audience should be viewed as problematic because that is the nature of academic work, given broad social divisions of labor. But there is a problem with the delusional nature of so much of this work. The delusion consists of a naïve view of the power of academic speech to directly change reality. The rhetorical mode of address used by academics writing cultural criticism, political philosophy, social philosophy, or what is now called social-political philosophy (which combines the other subfield approaches), often proceeds as though its authors are making grand entries in a planetary cabala, where words have the immediate power to become their intended referents.

Those who do not write and speak cabalistically may subscribe to the Trickle-Down Good Ideas Theory that can be traced from Plato to John Stuart Mill to John Rawls. Subscription to that theory is immediately self-flattering, but it lacks reliable empirical support.16 Although, after the US civil rights movement, there has been an uncanny coincidence of race-blind formal racial equality with the hegemony in political philosophy of Rawls’s requirement that those who plan fundamental social institutions do so in ignorance of their own societal environments. As we saw in chapter 1, Rawls was quite explicit about this:

I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to which generation they belong.17

Both race-blind racial equality and Rawlsian ideals are compatible with race-based real inequality. There are, of course, counter-examples, such as Katherine MacKinnon’s work on sexual harassment in the workplace as expressed in current law and institutional policy.18 Nevertheless even very good academic political discourse about justice and injustice cannot be relied upon to attract implementation or application in real life. This may be because there has not been sufficient time for the development of training programs for a new profession of “bridgers,” who could translate good ideas in the academy for those who govern and make policy. An internal problem for such translators would be to decide where to anchor their bridges in fields—every humanistic field—where experts disagree. However, the current tradition of progressive academic writing and speech is less than half a century old and if and when such translators emerge, they will develop their own professional criteria for choosing among contending experts.

PUBLIC DISCOURSE, ATMOSPHERE, AND CLIMATE

Public media, as a democratic analogue to disagreement within academic discourse, supports the idea that expressing and airing views in day-to-day practices or special “national conversations” also have immediate practical results. It is not evident how there could be such results, when opposing views and opinions are treated with the same respect and have equal access to the same mass auditorium that lacks rules for evidence or valid argument. As with academic discourse, there is no structured connection to official decision processes. The only reliable result of participation in such unbinding referenda is that those who participate are able to express themselves and get attention that may benefit them in the marketplace of their related endeavors.

#### Intellectual critiques of mastery fail and logically contradict

Davison ‘1 [Aidan; 2001; Geography and Environmental Studies at the University of Tasmania; *Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability*, p. 132-136]

We are cautioned by Heidegger not to rush headlong into action aimed at solving an evident but. he assures us, nonetheless inessential problem such as the destruction of a river valley through the construction of a hydroelectric dam. Heidegger insists that in our urgent hurry we will miss the real threat, which is not to the valley or even its displaced human residents, but to the pos­sibilities for human thinking itself. Yet there can be no doubt that our decision to sit quietly meditating on our breath or poetry involves many difficult practi­cal choices. To sit still *in the* midst of the restlessness of the technological world is as much‑indeed, is more‑ deliberate action than rushing out the door brandishing a placard. Simply sitting and reading Heidegger implies a host of practical judgments. To put aside books on integrated business management and be bothered with Heideggers ontological questions at all runs counter to the self‑assuredness and instrumentalism of the latemodern world. And remain­ing open to these questions, if we choose to be so bothered, is difficult amid the burly burly of technological life?r Contrary to Dreyfus. I consider that "ecological destruction, inextricably ontological and corporeal.The literature of radical ecophilosophy attests to this being so. My concern about the accumulation of carcino­genic *pesticides* and heavy metals in the tissues of my children is at once a concern with the technological diminishment of human pocsibilities and a concern with the practical task of living in more sane, more careful ways. Certainly my preoccupation with the well‑being of my children could be nar­rowly construed as a mere instrumentalizing concern with the survival of my genes Similarly ambivalent are alternatives to harmful, unsustainable practices offered via the ecomodernist drive for ecoefficiency. If I can afford them. I can choose from alternatives such as genetically engineered pest resistance, the sub­stitution of timber in my house, and of lead in petrol and paints, by more sophisticated synthetic products of industrial laboratories. However, history has shown the propensity of such solutions to create new sets of problems, for which new *sets* of technological solutions are soon required. This is, after all, the dynamic of technological profligacy that *defines* modernity There is thus much weight to Dreyfus' argument that to attempt to solve our problems in this way is to move another step further clown the path to fully technologized forms of life that obliterate the possibility of our encountering our relational selfhood. But where does this leave us as we negotiate the ambiguities of daily life? If I choose to reduce toxicity in my family's diet by the collection of rain water, by turning my backyard and local public land over to organic forms of food production, by adopting simple passive design methods to reduce the risk of termite damage, by cycling to avoid the combustion of fuel, or by bartering for the vegetable‑based paints made by a neighbor, am I necessarily falling prey to a death‑defying desire for control? Conversely, are philosophers who spend long hours meditating on Hólderlin or the *term in* their everyday practices, thereby released from the oppressive ontological grasp of technology! I think not.

### 1NC---Political Engagement Good

#### Analysis of systems of powers requires contingency---confronting proximate causes is valuable

Pappas, 17—Associate Professor of Philosophy at Texas A& M University (Gregory Fernando, not Alexander Diamond, Michigan/GBN debate and baseball superstar, “The Limitations and Dangers of Decolonial Philosophies: Lessons from Zapatista Luis Villoro,” Radical Philosophy Review, March 31, 2017, dml)

What about modernity and liberalism? Is the modern project an emancipatory project or a colonial one, as is often stressed by decolonial theorists? This question is too general or assumes that there is a simple answer. If one stipulates by definition that modernity stands for ideas and events that anyone would regard as evil, then of course total condemnation of modernity is the only logical conclusion. However, one has to wonder about the historical accuracy of a philosopher that uses the category of modernity to include events and ideas in different places and during long periods of time. This is why some historians, such as Ricardo Salvatore, have been puzzled by how some decolonial theorists use of the notions of modernity and coloniality. As he states, “Historians are likely to resist the homogenization into a single polarity (modernity/coloniality) of different types or waves of modernity.”42 Salvatore argues that no one doubts that events and structures of power invented in 1492 have had lasting effects in a region, but “to the extent that these processes have had a differential impact upon distinct regions and according to different moments of time, generalizations about the persistence of the modern/colonial seem to erase crucial differences among localities and periods.”43 Thus according to Salvatore from a historical point of view, “we need to challenge this homogenization of a long-term persistence of the colonial.”44 The impact of European colonization was very different in different regions of Mesoamerica. I am not a historian; my concern is rather how the tendencies in decolonial thought toward this sort of historical lumping together and linear narratives about a single source of evil across history can result in oversimplifications in the diagnosis and proposed solutions to local evils.

What is admirable about Villoro is his respect for historical accuracy and complexity when it comes to the relation between ideas, movements, events, and the actual consequences of good and evil. As much as Dussel and Mignolo, Villoro occasionally made overall negative assessments about modernity and liberalism, but he would qualify them and admit that history reveals a much more ambiguous and complex reality on the ground in regard to good and evil. For instance, the relation between the European Enlightment and the actual conditions on the ground in different societies was complex. While in some places it had an antiauthoritarian and liberatory function in regard to certain issues such as religion and dogma, in other times and places it did nothing but support the oppression of certain groups. Villoro acknowledges the same complexity of good and evil in regard to scholasticism, the church, positivism, modernity, the project and ideals of the Mexican and U.S. revolutions, the civil rights movement, and so on.

To be clear, decolonialists are correct that liberalism has been used to mask oppression and white supremacy. They are also correct in their rejection of the idea that colonialism and oppression were a separate or just unfortunate side effect of modernity. The danger is slipping into claims about necessary relations or assuming that modernity or liberalism can never be anything but an ideological excuse to dominate, colonize, or oppress. This can be avoided by encouraging more rigorous, careful, and historically sensitive analysis of what particular aspects and assumptions (e.g., ontological, epistemological, and ethical ones) are problematic instead of just blanket statements or relying on some theoretical barometer of domination. This is what Villoro did. For instance, he was critical of the prioritization of the individual over the social in liberalism, how it denies the fundamental sociality of human beings, and assumes a hostile self/other relation that makes it easy to justify domination.45

#### Institutional engagement isn’t native capitulation to the settler state and has the capacity to produce meaningful progress

Darian-Smith 10, Global and International Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, (Eve, Environmental Law and Native American Law, Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 2010. 6:359–86)

Examples of relatively successful cooperation between the EPA and native communities are that of the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation in northeastern Oregon, the Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of the Chippewa Indians in northwestern Wisconsin, the Pala Band of Mission Indians in northern San Diego county, the Mole Lake Band of Chippewa in Wisconsin (Nesper 2010), and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe in northern New York State. Significantly, all five tribes own successful Indian casino enterprises and hotels. With respect to the latter, over the past decade the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe has made good use of the EPA’s commitment to respect its sovereign state status and deal with its vast environmental problems. These problems stem from the 1950s when General Motors and Alcoa built large production plants next to the Mohawk reservation that produced thousands of tons of hazardous waste that bled into the St. Lawrence River, upstream from the tribe. In the 1970s and 1980s, the tribe began to see illness among its members, particularly young people attending a school situated yards from General Motor’s property. One member of the tribe, Katsi Cook, invited pathologist Ward Stone to come to the reservation and collect samples. Stone found alarming levels of toxins in the fat of local animals such as frogs and ducks, as well as in the breast milk of Indian women. The tribe became proactive. It hired lawyers, developed an environmental division within its government, and began working with the EPA to initiate air and water quality programs. According to the Mohawk’s environmental health education specialist Lawrence Swamp, the tribe was driven by necessity to create one of the most advanced tribal environmental programs in the country. Achieving TAS status, the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe can now set its own water and air quality standards on its reservation, forcing adjacent industries to comply with those standards. Notes Swamp (1996): A key element in the Environment Division’s success is its negotiating strategy and relations with other agencies. The relationship between the Tribe and EPA was a little rocky at the beginning because the EPA did not recognize the need to work with the Tribe on a governmentto-government basis....Through persistent pressure and tough negotiations, the Tribe was able to muscle its way into the negotiation process as a legitimate partner. The importance of Indian gaming enterprise should not be downplayed in any conversation about TAS status for tribal governments. Profits from gaming have given some tribes the financial resources to create environmental divisions within their governments, consult with scientists and other experts, and mount legal action for TAS status. Notably, of the 46 federally recognized tribes who have achieved TAS status under the EPA Clean Water Act between 1992–2009, 41 tribes run casinos, a few are in the process of building casinos, and the Hualapai Indian Tribe used to run a bingo hall but has now diversified its investments into a vacation destination overlooking the Grand Canyon.4 The exception to this connection between gaming and tribal environmental control is the Hopi Tribe, which has managed to establish cultural museums and stores that attract tourist dollars. Although all of the 46 tribes represent varying degrees of success in addressing the wide range of environmental problems facing their communities, it is essential to remember that most tribes in the United States do not have equivalent financial resources and face an uphill battle to get basic needs met such as access to clean water and proper sewerage treatment. As scholars have noted, “Tribal governments have begun to lift their communities out of poverty and economic desperation, but this is an enormous task that will take many generations to accomplish” (Harvard Project 2008, p. 1920). The capacity of tribes to resist and/or cooperate with governmental agencies is undermined by a long history of colonial oppression of native peoples coupled with the circulation of stereotypical images and conceptions of Native Americans in mainstream society. These images and preconceptions often prevent open dialogue and create hurdles in the building of relationships between native and non-native parties based on mutual respect. Unfortunately, the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe’s experience of having to “muscle its way into the negotiation process” is not unique. Despite the EPA’s commitment to involving native communities in environmental programs and policymaking, political cooperation does not come easily. Each tribe raises a unique set of circumstances and must be dealt with on a case-bycase basis. Furthermore, there is much distrust of and resistance to federal agents by tribal communities for obvious historical reasons. Genocide and ecocide taint Indian and non-Indian relations (Grinde & Johansen 1995, LaDuke 1999, Jaimes et al. 1999, Churchill 1993). Distrust is exacerbated by the ways tribes are forced to present themselves as authentically native and culturally distinct from white society in order to gain access to political and legal forums (Dombrowski 2001, p. 13). Once granted access to these forums, however, native peoples must then speak according to dominant forms of legal and scientific discourse in order to be taken seriously by industries, policy makers, courts, and the EPA (Espeland 1994, Buchanan 2009, Martello & Jasanoff 2004, Nadasdy 2003, Deloria 1995). As noted by sociolegal scholars, land and water conflicts are often “no less than fundamental epistemological conflicts” (Sefiha & Lauderdale 2008, p. 508). Managing long-standing stereotypes about native peoples poses yet another difficulty to overcoming resistance and seeking cooperation between Indian and non-Indian communities, at least from the perspective of tribal governments (Barta 1997, Jahoda 1999, Mihesuah 1996, Churchill 2001, Huhndorf 2001). These stereotypes include the strongly held notion that native peoples are passive and without agency, and if not passive, then certainly not smart enough or organized enough to oppose industries such as General Motors. Another prevailing stereotype that hampers cooperation between Indian and non-Indian groups is the widespread belief that all native peoples love nature. From the time of earliest colonization, and reinforced by environmental movements in the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see above), Indians have been romanticized in mainstream society as living in spiritual harmony with the natural world (Bordewich 1997, Krech 2000, Harkin & Lewis 2007). This stereotype precludes non-Indians from appreciating that tribal lands are a vital economic resource for native people, thus impeding Indians from developing their reservation lands for economic profit if they so desire (Abramson & Theodossopoulus 2001). If tribes indicate an interest in leasing land to mining companies, building casinos, or accommodating a nuclear waste storage facility on reservation land, local community and environmental groups have typically condemned them for being “greedy,” “hypocritical,” and ultimately not “authentic” Indians (Darian-Smith 2003; Lewis 2007; Nadasdy 2005, p. 318). As Lewis (1995, p. 439) has observed, the constraints of racial stereotypes have “unintentionally denied Native Americans their humanity, culture, history, and most importantly, their modernity.” Only through increased conversation between Indian and non-Indian groups may stereotypes be broken down and opportunities opened up for sincere collaboration. We have some such examples. To defend their treaty rights to participate in traditional hunting of walleyed pike from the lakes of Wisconsin and Minnesota, the Ojibwe and their non-Indian supporters created a new composite coalition to effectively combat the white supremacists that opposed them. In part, the coalition’s success can be attributed to its creation of new racial identities for both natives and their white allies, allowing people who had previously been divided along essentialized racist lines to come together as a collective (Lipsitz 2007, Nesper 2002, Whaley & Bresette 1994). Other instances of cooperation are emerging between tribes. For example, intertribal natural resource management agencies such as the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission, the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, and the Northwest Indian Fishing Commission have developed to handle fishing rights in Wisconsin, Washington, Oregon, and Michigan. In various ways, these commissions seek to bring together tribes and states for the purpose of environmental management. According to the Web site of the Northwest Indian Fishing Commission (http://www.nwifc.org/about-us): The role of the NWIFC is to assist member tribes in their role as natural resources comanagers. The commission provides direct services to tribes in areas such as biometrics, fish health and salmon management to achieve an economy of scale that makes more efficient use of limited federal funding. The NWIFC also provides a forum for tribes to address shared natural resources management issues and enables the tribes to speak with a unified voice in Washington, D.C. The EPA seems to appreciate the transformative potential of cooperation and toward this end provides advice, maps, and links to a range of agencies about how best to work effectively with tribal governments, as well as brokering tribe-to-tribe communication by sharing knowledge and other resources.5 This facilitating of dialogue reflects more widespread attitudes within environmental justice circles that recognize a need to empower local communities through coalition politics, particularly in the face of global warming and other transborder and multi-jurisdictional environmental issues (Grossman 2001; Martello & Jasanoff 2004, p. 4; Pellow & Brulle 2005; Gunningham 2008). Empowering local communities, as the environmental justice movement urges, demands greater recognition of indigenous sovereignty. Historically, however, the concept of native sovereignty has been problematic in the United States. The argument that tribes are in some way equivalent to sovereign nations—nations within nations—has caused constant legal and political tension (Wilkinson 1987, Deloria 1998, Wilkins & Lomawaima 2002). Chief Justice John Marshall’s trilogy of Indian cases in the 1820s and 1830s held that tribes are not foreign states as envisaged under the U.S. Constitution, but rather are domestic dependent nations in a state of pupilage. In short, a tribe’s relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian ( Johnson v. M’Intosh 1823). The degree to which a tribal government is deemed a ward of the state has shifted over the decades, and ambiguities and inconsistencies with respect to the concept of tribal sovereignty plague Indian and non-Indian relations to this day (Wilkins 2008, p. 244). Nonetheless, despite general confusion in federal and state Indian law over the meaning of native sovereignty, there do appear to be recognizable trends in judicial interpretation (Wiessner 2008). Typically, U.S. courts interpret the concept of native sovereignty to accord with the institutional and economic interests of the state, or of the industries that the state supports, to the detriment of tribal interests. These interpretations stress that tribes do not hold inherent sovereign power and are only qualified to exercise any form of selfgovernment because, by virtue of their status as wards, that right has been delegated to them by the United States (Tweedy 2009). As Biolsi (2005, p. 243) notes, the court’s idea of tribal sovereignty is “limited, in fact, to the point that it does not make logical sense to many Indian people, is not really sovereignty at all from their point of view, and can only be understood as bespeaking a profoundly racist view of Indians on the part of Congress, the courts, and white people in general.” Against trends of U.S. judicial interpretation that seek to limit the concept of inherent native sovereignty, federal environmental regulations have provided a mechanism for some tribes to reassert their sovereign authority “by effectively creating a presumption in favor of tribal jurisdiction” (Tweedy 2005, 2009). As mentioned above, the EPA’s Indian Policy was introduced in the 1980s when the federal government and American society in general dismissed native peoples as out of sight and mind on distant reservations. No one anticipated the enormous shift in fortune among a few tribes as a result of the development of Indian gaming enterprises. These enterprises granted tribes the ability to participate in mainstream political activities for the first time (Darian-Smith 2003, Champagne 2004). They provided, among other things, the economic resources to mount formal applications under the EPA to be granted state status and the authority to regulate environmental standards on reservation lands. As the legal scholar Grijalva (2008, p. xi) has noted: The Agency [EPA] has repeatedly exercised its substantial authority under the modern environmental laws to link Congress’ preference for local program implementation with federal Indian law’s doctrine of retained tribal sovereignty in a legal and administrative framework effectively offering tribes a coequal seat at the table. The seat comes with an unparalleled opportunity for translating tribal environmental value judgments into federally enforceable requirements constraining Indian and non-Indian polluters inside and outside Indian country. It offers a genuine chance for tribes to protect and preserve the health and welfare of their citizens, the quality of Indian country environment, and most importantly, their land-based Indigenous culture. Over the years, EPA’s policy of recognizing indigenous sovereignty has caused increasing tension between native and non-native communities. One example of conflict is that experienced by the Pala Band of Mission Indians in northern San Diego County, which received state-like status from the EPA in 2008. This status means the tribe must be notified when a project that may cause air pollution is proposed within 50 miles of the reservation. Whether the status can prevent the building of the Gregory Canyon landfill, planned to be built just west of the reservation, and against which the tribe has objected for over a decade, is not certain. In any case, according to Doug Elmets, a spokesperson for the Pala Band, the importance of the EPA’s determination is that “[i]t’s as much a recognition of the status of the tribe as it is their ability to comment on air quality issues that would affect members” (Pfingsten 2008). Public objections to the Pala Band’s new state-like designation were considerable. In the words of one blogger, “So a project within 50 miles, impacting upwards of 650 people, must be reviewed by the tribe. What about the impacts tribal expansion has on upwards of 6.5 million people? We have a right to know what’s up their sleeves. This is a runaway train!” The Pala Band’s experience of local antagonism is not unique. The Pala Band is one of many tribes that have been the focus of public ire and political attack in recent years. The rise of Indian gaming and the increased recognition of tribal sovereignty that has accompanied it have generated a backlash against so-called rich Indians who, it is argued, now receive special rights (Dudas 2008, 2005; GoldbergHiller & Milner 2003). This backlash against empowered native communities represents a new twist in the growing recognition of Indian sovereignty through environmental law avenues. The long-standing stereotype of Indians as stewards of the environment prevents many non-Indians from appreciating that native peoples are full citizens and should be able to exercise their property rights in the same way that non-Indians exercise theirs. This includes the right of tribes to log or mine reservation lands as a source of income or, in the case of the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians in Utah, to build a nuclear waste dump (Lewis 2007). Indian sovereignty means that tribes should have ultimate control over their reservation land, be it either to protect it or to use it, as a tribe sees fit. It also means that tribes have the right to practice their own notion of environmentalism that may or may not accord with Western paradigms (Nadasdy 2005). It seems that mainstream American society is still grappling with the idea of modern Indians and may not yet be prepared to accommodate the full implications of indigenous sovereignty, particularly as it emerges within the context of U.S. environmental law and regulation. The inadvertent yet increasing recognition of indigenous sovereignty within U.S. domestic law echoes more explicit developments in international law. Since the 1970s, efforts have been made to unite native peoples around the world and establish pan-native social movements to further the recognition of indigenous sovereignty. Toward this goal, forums such as the International Indian Treaty Council (1974), World Council of Indigenous Peoples (1975), UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (1985), and the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (2002) have been established. Many of these groups played a role in the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of 1989. The ILO treaty has now been ratified by almost all Latin American countries and ensures that the rights of native groups over legal status, lands, and environment are at the center of many states’ political concerns (Fischer 2009; Warren & Jackson 2002; Royster & Blumm 2007, pp. 517–604). In 2007, the ratification of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples focused additional world attention on indigenous sovereignty and native rights to their lands and territories (Xanthaki 2007; Wiessner 2008; Charters et al. 2010; Allen & Xanthaki 2010). Among the many issues identified in the declaration, indigenous peoples’ rights to the preservation, conservation, and development of their environment were prominent. The declaration represents, in the words of UN Special Rapporteur S. James Anaya, an important contribution to international customary law by presenting “an authoritative common understanding, at the global level, of the minimum content of the rights of indigenous peoples” (cited in Wiessner 2008, p. 1162). Significantly, 143 countries signed the UN Declaration with only four refusing: the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Australia subsequently reversed its decision). Despite these notable state exceptions, the 20 years of work culminating in the 2007 declaration have invigorated new thoughts about indigenous-state relations and new political theories that take into account competing and overlapping legal jurisdictions at international and national levels (Barker 2005, Ivison et al. 2008, Champagne 2005, Weissner 1999, Anaya & Williams 2001, Anaya 2004, Hall & Fenelon 2009). The degree to which the United States will be receptive to the concept of indigenous sovereignty as it is promoted through international law remains to be seen. What is reasonably sure, however, is that as concerns over climate change and global warming intensify, U.S. environmental law will increasingly have to navigate and accommodate international environmental legal developments. And these international legal developments are increasingly addressing, among other things, indigenous peoples’ rights over land. The cumulative and compounding pressures from international and domestic environmental laws that elevate the stature of indigenous authority suggest that the United States, whether it welcomes it or not, will be forced to confront non-Western values and perspectives with respect to the preservation, conservation, and sustainability of natural resources. One result may be that the United States can no longer treat the environment as something to be conquered and a resource to be economically exploited. In the future, U.S. environmental law, which has conventionally viewed the environment as a “universal, objective reality” separate from society and human experience (Kapoor 2001, p. 270), may have to embrace alternative epistemological viewpoints and sets of ecological priorities. To put it another way, U.S. environmental law may be on trajectory whereby it becomes, if only in part, decolonized.

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#### Plain meaning of the resolution is a *floor not a ceiling* - Conquergood advocates for exactly this type of “text-performance hybridity”

2AC Conquergood 2 (Dwight Conquergood “Performance Studies :Interventions and Radical Research” The Drama Review 46, 2 (T174), Summer 2002. Copyright 2002 New York University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

There is an emergent genre of performance studies scholarship that epitomizes this text-performance hybridity. A number of performance studies-allied scholars create performances as a supplement to, not substitute for, their written research. These performance pieces stand alongside and in metonymic tension with pub- lished research. The creative works are developed for multiple professional rea- sons: they deepen experiential and participatory engagement with materials both for the researcher and her audience; they provide a dynamic and rhetorically compelling alternative to conference papers; they offer a more accessible and engaging format for sharing research and reaching communities outside academia; they are a strategy for staging interventions. To borrow Amanda Kemp's apt phrase, they use "performance both as a way of knowing and as a way of showing" (I998: I6). To add another layer to the enfolding convolutions of text and per- formance, several of these performance pieces have now been written up and published in scholarly journals and books (see Conquergood 1988; Becker, McCall, and Morris 1989; McCall and Becker I990; Paget I990; Pollock 1990; Jackson 1993, 1998; Allen and Garner 1995; Laughlin 1995; Wellin 1996; Jones 1997; Kemp I998). Performance studies is uniquely suited for the challenge of braiding together disparate and stratified ways of knowing. We can think through performance along three crisscrossing lines of activity and analysis. We can think of perfor- mance (I) as a work of imagination, as an object of study; (2) as a pragmatics of inquiry (both as model and method), as an optic and operator of research; (3) as a tactics of intervention, an alternative space of struggle. Speaking from my home department at Northwestern, we often refer to the three a's of performance studies: artistry, analysis, activism. Or to change the alliteration, a commitment to the three c's of performance studies: creativity, critique, citizenship (civic strug- gles for social justice). We struggle to forge a unique and unifying mission around the triangulations of these three pivot points: I. Accomplishment-the making of art and remaking of culture; creativity; em- bodiment; artistic process and form; knowledge that comes from doing, par- ticipatory understanding, practical consciousness, performing as a way of knowing. 2. Analysis-the interpretation of art and culture; critical reflection; thinking about, through, and with performance; performance as a lens that illuminates the constructed creative, contingent, collaborative dimensions of human com- munication; knowledge that comes from contemplation and comparison; concentrated attention and contextualization as a way of knowing. 3. Articulation-activism, outreach, connection to community; applications and interventions; action research; projects that reach outside the academy and are rooted in an ethic of reciprocity and exchange; knowledge that is tested by practice within a community; social commitment, collaboration, and contri- bution/intervention as a way of knowing: praxis.

#### Speaking the language of power turns the case

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As against Alfred’s call for eschewing the framework of “sovereignty,” Dale Turner insists that the **protection of Native peoples involves** making their **concerns** and **representations intelligible within** the **legal and political structures of the settler state**. In This Is Not a Peace Pipe, Turner argues that the **political terrain on which Native** peoples **must move** has been **mapped by the settler state** and that **if they are to gain greater traction** for their land claims and assertions of governmental autonomy, they will need to **express them** in ways **that non-Native** people and **institutions can understand**: “As a matter of survival, **Aboriginal intellectuals must engage** the **non-Aboriginal intellectual landscapes from which** their **political rights and sovereignty** are **articulated** and put to use in Aboriginal communities.”66 Given that non-Native political processes already are active in shaping the terms of Indigenous governance and social life, **Native** peoples cannot **afford simply to ignore them or** to insist on the significance of “traditional” knowledge in ways that **speak past non-Native modes of articulation**. Turner suggests that such translation is the work of “the word warrior,” whose “most difficult task will be to **reconcile indigenous ways of knowing with** the **forms of knowledge that define European intellectual traditions**.”67 “Survival” for Native polities, from this perspective, is predicated on a kind of communication in which discrepant “ways of knowing” can be bridged. However, to what extent does Turner’s notion of “**reconcil[ing]” knowledges** also present the struggle over sovereignty as a function of cultural dissonance **between Indigenous peoples and the settler state**? The central question he poses is, “How do we explain our differences and in the process **empower ourselves to actually change** the **state’s legal and political practices**?”68 But does **transposing Indigenous concepts into non-Native terminologies intervene** in the logic structuring “the state’s legal and political practices”? Does such a conversion challenge the jurisdictional imperative and imaginary driving the settler-state assertion of authority over Native peoples?

The idea of “explain[ing]” Indigenous “differences” acknowledges the imperial force exerted under the sign of sovereignty, but it does not contest the state’s monopoly over the legitimate exercise of legitimacy, nor does it prevent those “differences” from being reified, regulated, and subordinated as “culture” in the ways discussed earlier. Alongside the discussion of the necessity for translation by “word warriors,” Turner also calls for a thorough accounting of the violences of settler-state imperialism: “The project of unpacking and laying bare the meaning and effects of colonialism will open up the physical and **intellectual space for Aboriginal voice to participate** in the **legal** and **political practices of the state**.”69 Later, he suggests that **Indigenous intellectuals should** pursue three goals: “(a) they must take up, **deconstruct**, and continue to **resist colonialism** and its effects on indigenous peoples; (b) they must protect and defend indigeneity; **and** (c) they must **engage the legal and political discourses of the state** in an effective way.”70 What kind of “participat[ion]” and “engage[ment]” do such strategies yield?

Although Turner tends to answer this question by focusing on the possibility of explaining Indigenous intellectual traditions, making them comprehensible to non-Natives, the above comments offer another option, namely, deconstructing the dynamics of settler-state power—problematizing the ways it seeks to generate legitimacy for itself. He describes such intervention as “understanding . . . how colonialism has been woven into the normative political language that guides contemporary Canadian legal and political practices,” and folding deconstruction back into the elaboration of “differences” between Natives and non-Natives, he argues, “**indigenous peoples must use** the **normative language of the dominant culture to** ultimately **defend world views** that are **embedded in completely different normative frameworks**.

#### Debating about topical plans can be revolutionary. Contrary to Greenberg, grounding debate in federal action doesn’t reproduce elitist or sovereign worldviews if you creatively design arguments to subvert that paradigm.

McGee and Romanelli 97—Assistant Professor in Communication Studies at Texas Tech AND Director of Debate at Loyola University of Chicago (Brian and David, “Policy Debate as Fiction: In Defense of Utopian Fiat,” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 18 (1997) 23-35, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]

Snider argued several years ago that a suitable paradigm should address “something we can ACTUALLY DO” as opposed to something we can MAKE BELIEVE ABOUT” (“Fantasy as Reality” 14). A utopian literature metaphor is beneficial precisely because it is within the power of debaters to perform the desired action suggested by the metaphor, if not always to demonstrate that the desired action is politically feasible.

Instead of debaters playing to an audience of those who make public policy, debaters should understand themselves as budding social critics in search of an optimal practical and cultural politics. While few of us will ever hold a formal policy-making position, nearly all of us grow up with the social and political criticism of the newspaper editorial page, the high school civics class, and, at least in homes that do not ban the juxtaposition of food and politics, the lively dinner table conversation. We complain about high income taxes, declining state subsidies for public education, and crumbling interstate highways. We worry about the rising cost of health care and wonder if we will have access to high-quality medical assistance when we need it. Finally, we bemoan the decline of moral consensus, rising rates of divorce, drug use among high school students, and disturbing numbers of pregnant teen-agers. From childhood on, we are told that good citizenship demands that we educate ourselves on political matters and vote to protect the polis; the success of democracy allegedly demands no less. For those who accept this challenge instead of embracing the political alienation of Generation X and becoming devotees of Beavis and Butthead, social criticism is what good citizens do.

Debate differs from other species of social criticism because debate is a game played by students who want to win. However, conceiving of debate as a kind of social criticism has considerable merit. Social criticism is not restricted to a technocratic elite or group of elected officials. Moreover, social criticism is not necessarily idle or wholly deconstructive. Instead, such criticism necessarily is a prerequisite to any effort to create policy change, whether that criticism is articulated by an elected official or by a mother of six whose primary workplace is the home. When one challenges the status quo, one normally implies that a better alternative course of action exists. Given that intercollegiate debate frequently involves exchanges over a proposition of policy by student advocates who are relatively unlikely ever to debate before Congress, envisioning intercollegiate debate as a specialized extension of ordinary citizen inquiry and advocacy in the public sphere seems attractive. Thinking of debate as a variety of social criticism gives debate an added dimension of public relevance.

One way to understand the distinction between debate as policy-making and debate as social criticism is to examine Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder’s agenda-building theory.5 Cobb and Elder are well known for their analytic split of the formal agenda for policy change, which includes legislation or other action proposed by policy makers with formal power (e.g., government bureaucrats, U.S. Senators), from the public agenda for policy change, which is composed of all those who work outside formal policy-making circles to exert influence on the formal agenda. Social movements, lobbyists, political action committees, mass media outlets, and public opinion polls all constitute the public agenda, which, in turn, has an effect on what issues come to the forefront on the formal agenda. From the agenda-building perspective, one cannot understand the making of public policy in the United States without comprehending the confluence of the formal and public agenda.

In intercollegiate debate, the policy-making metaphor has given primacy to formal agenda functions at the expense of the public agenda. Debaters are encouraged to bypass thinking about the public agenda in outlining policy alternatives; appeals for policy change frequently are made by debaters under the strange pretense that they and/or their judges are members of the formal agenda elite. Even arguments about the role of the public in framing public policy are typically issued by debaters as if those debaters were working within the confines of the formal agenda for their own, instrumental advantage. (For example, one thinks of various social movement “backlash” disadvantage arguments, which advocate a temporary policy paralysis in order to stir up public outrage and mobilize social movements whose leaders will demand the formal adoption of a presumably superior policy alternative.) The policy-making metaphor concentrates on the formal agenda to the near exclusion of the public agenda, as the focus of a Katsulas or a Dempsey on the “real-world” limitations for making policy indicates.

Debate as social criticism does not entail exclusion of formal agenda concerns from intercollegiate debate. The specified agent of action in typical policy resolutions makes ignoring the formal agenda of the United States government an impossibility. However, one need not be able to influence the formal agenda directly in order to discuss what it is that the United States government should do. Undergraduate debaters and their judges usually are far removed—both physically and functionally—from the arena of formal-agenda deliberation. What the disputation of student debaters most closely resembles, to the extent that it resembles any real-world analog, is public-agenda social criticism. What students are doing is something they really CAN do as students and ordinary citizens; they are working in their own modest way to shape the public agenda.

While “social criticism” is the best explanation for what debaters do, this essay goes a step further. The mode of criticism in which debaters operate is the production of utopian literature. Strictly speaking, debaters engage in the creation of fictions and the comparison of fictions to one another. How else does one explain the affirmative advocacy of a plan, a counterfactual world that, by definition, does not exist? Indeed, traditional inherency burdens demand that such plans be utopian, in the sense that current attitudes or structures make the immediate enactments of such plans unlikely in the “real world” of the formal agenda. Intercollegiate debate is utopian because plan and/or counterplan enactment is improbable. While one can distinguish between incremental and radical policy change proposals, the distinction makes no difference in the utopian practice of intercollegiate debate.

More importantly, intercollegiate debate is utopian in another sense. Policy change is considered because such change, it is hoped, will facilitate the pursuit of the good life. For decades, intercollegiate debaters have used fiat or the authority of the word “should” to propose radical changes in the social order, in addition to advocacy of the incremental policy changes typical of the U.S. formal agenda. This wide range of policy alternatives discussed in contemporary intercollegiate debate is the sign of a healthy public sphere, where thorough consideration of all policy alternatives is a possibility. Utopian fiction, in which the good place that is no place is envisioned, makes possible the instantiation of a rhetorical vision prerequisite to building that good place in our tiny corner of the universe. Even Lewis Mumford, a critic of utopian thought, concedes that we “can never reach the points of the compass; and so no doubt we shall never live in utopia; but without the magnetic needle we should not be able to travel intelligently at all” (Mumford 24-25).

An objection to this guiding metaphor is that it encourages debaters to do precisely that to which Snider would object, which is to “make believe” that utopia is possible. This objection misunderstands the argument. These students already are writers of utopian fiction from the moment they construct their first plan or counterplan text. Debaters who advocate policy change announce their commitment to changing the organization of society in pursuit of the good life, even though they have no formal power to call this counterfactual world into being. Any proposed change, no matter how small, is a repudiation of policy paralysis [limitations] and the maintenance of the status quo. As already practiced, debate revolves around utopian proposals, at least in the sense that debaters and judges lack the formal authority to enact their proposals. Even those negatives who defend the current social order frequently do so by pointing to the potential dystopic consequences of accepting such proposals for change.

Understanding debate as utopian literature would not eliminate references to the vagaries of making public policy, including debates over the advantageousness of plans and counterplans. As noted above, talking about public policy is not making public policy, and a retreat from the policy-making metaphor would have relatively little effect on the contemporary practice of intercollegiate debate.6 For example, while space constraints prevent a thorough discussion of this point, the utopian literature metaphor would not necessitate the removal of all constraints on fiat, although some utopian proposals will tax the imagination where formal-agenda policy change is concerned.

The utopian literature metaphor does not ineluctably divorce debate from the problems and concerns of ordinary people and everyday life. There will continue to be debates focused on incremental policy changes as steps along the path to utopia. What the utopian literature metaphor does is to position debaters, coaches, and judges as the unapologetic social critics that they are and have always been, without the confining influence of a guiding metaphor that limits their ability to search for the good life. Further, this metaphor does not encourage the debaters to carry the utopian literature metaphor to extremes by imagining that they are sitting in a corner and penning the next great American novel. The metaphor is useful because it orients debaters to their role as social critics, without the suggestion that debate is anything other than an educational game played by undergraduate students.

#### the study their author cites indicates their teaching moment doesn’t produce solution-based thinking

Brezina 96 Timothy Brezina, “Teaching Inequality: A Simple Counterfactual Exercise,” Teaching Sociology, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), pp. 218-224. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1318814.pdf>

***\*NOTE: this is the same author that their Warren article cites, but it seems that Warren spelled “Brezina” wrong… (we place a copy of the works cited below to verify our claim)***

Frustration is another problematic re- sponse I have received from students. After conducting the thought experiment de- scribed above, one student stated that she understood how inequality "seems to be built into society," but did not see what could "be done about it." Credential infla- tion appears to be a matter ofspecial concern in this regard; even students who otherwise express little interest in societal inequalities seem to be highly interested in possible so- lutions to this problem. For current under- graduates, the process of credential inflation is much more than a simple, real-world il- lustration of stratification principles. They view the increasing numbers of college graduates, and the resulting decline in the value of educational credentials, as a relevant fact of life that threatens to undermine soci- ety's "promise" to reward those individuals who demonstrate effort and ability, and who do what is necessary to obtain high levels of education. Hence the question "What can be done?" Specifically, what can be done to ensure that motivated and able individuals, no matter what their numbers, will be pro- vided with real opportunities to achieve eco- nomic success?

***Warren Waren works cited page for reference***

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# 1NR

## K

### 1NR---AT: Perm

#### Instrumentalization is key to prevent colonial interventions and confront capitalism

Stanescu ‘14 [James, January 7, Professional Lecturer in Philosophy at American University, in Washington, D.C. Critical Animal, “Abstraction, Calculative Thinking, Global Warming, and Environmental Ethics; or the Polar Vortex of Thinking!,” http://criticalanimal.blogspot.com/2014/01/abstraction-calculative-thinking-global.html]

Moreover, we will not be saved by virtue, infinite responsibility for the infinite other, or voluntarism. What we need is better abstractions, more calculative thinking, more en-framing, and stronger institutional responses. As David Wood has shown, when it comes to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Katrina, global warming, and a variety of other events, it has been the conservative response to embrace the impossibility of calculative thought. Perhaps our project going further is to, as Isabelle Stengers has argued, to calculate again. This is not the calculative thought of the capitalist cost-benefit system, but a different calculation. It is, to steal a phrase from Jane Bennett, about mutually enabling instrumentalizations. Long quotation from Stengers ahead, so bear with me: The cosmopolitical Parliament is not primarily a place where instantaneous decisions are made, but a delocalized place. It exists every time a "we" is constructed that does not identify with the identity of a solution but hesitates before a problem. I associate this "we" with the only slogan Leibniz ever proposed: Calculemus. Let us calculate. It's an odd expression, constructed to conceptualize the possibility of peace during a time of war. But Leibniz was a mathematician, not an accountant or statistician. For him, calculation was not a mere balance sheet contrasting homogeneous quantities, calculations of interest or benefits that were presented as being commensurable. For a mathematician, the accuracy of a calculation and the validity of its result are relatively simple questions, "trivial" in the language of mathematics. What is important, and which is not in the least trivial, is the position of the problem that will, possibly, allow it to be calculated, the precise creation of relationships and constraints, the distinction between the various ingredients, the exploration of the roles they are liable to play, the determinations or indeterminations they engender or bring about. There is no commensurability without the invention of a measurement, and the challenge of Leibniz's calculemus is, precisely, the creation of a "we" that excludes all external measures, all prior agreements separating those who are entitled to "enter" into the calculation and those subject to its result. [...] Calculemus, therefore, does not mean "let us measure," "let us add," "let us compare," but, first and foremost, let us create the "we" associated with the nature and terms of the operation to be risked. It is not a question of acting in the name of truth and justice, but of creating commensurability. It is a question of knowing that the "truth" of the created common measure will always be relative to what such creation will have been capable of, knowing also that a radical heterogeneity preexists such creation, the absence of any preexisting shared measure among the ingredients to be articulated. (Cosmopolitics II, pp. 399-401).

### 1NR---AT: Root Cause

#### Root cause claim is wrong

Pappas, 17—Associate Professor of Philosophy at Texas A& M University (Gregory Fernando, not Alexander Diamond, Michigan/GBN debate and baseball superstar, “The Limitations and Dangers of Decolonial Philosophies: Lessons from Zapatista Luis Villoro,” Radical Philosophy Review, March 31, 2017, dml)

What about modernity and liberalism? Is the modern project an emancipatory project or a colonial one, as is often stressed by decolonial theorists? This question is too general or assumes that there is a simple answer. If one stipulates by definition that modernity stands for ideas and events that anyone would regard as evil, then of course total condemnation of modernity is the only logical conclusion. However, one has to wonder about the historical accuracy of a philosopher that uses the category of modernity to include events and ideas in different places and during long periods of time. This is why some historians, such as Ricardo Salvatore, have been puzzled by how some decolonial theorists use of the notions of modernity and coloniality. As he states, “Historians are likely to resist the homogenization into a single polarity (modernity/coloniality) of different types or waves of modernity.”42 Salvatore argues that no one doubts that events and structures of power invented in 1492 have had lasting effects in a region, but “to the extent that these processes have had a differential impact upon distinct regions and according to different moments of time, generalizations about the persistence of the modern/colonial seem to erase crucial differences among localities and periods.”43 Thus according to Salvatore from a historical point of view, “we need to challenge this homogenization of a long-term persistence of the colonial.”44 The impact of European colonization was very different in different regions of Mesoamerica. I am not a historian; my concern is rather how the tendencies in decolonial thought toward this sort of historical lumping together and linear narratives about a single source of evil across history can result in oversimplifications in the diagnosis and proposed solutions to local evils.

What is admirable about Villoro is his respect for historical accuracy and complexity when it comes to the relation between ideas, movements, events, and the actual consequences of good and evil. As much as Dussel and Mignolo, Villoro occasionally made overall negative assessments about modernity and liberalism, but he would qualify them and admit that history reveals a much more ambiguous and complex reality on the ground in regard to good and evil. For instance, the relation between the European Enlightment and the actual conditions on the ground in different societies was complex. While in some places it had an antiauthoritarian and liberatory function in regard to certain issues such as religion and dogma, in other times and places it did nothing but support the oppression of certain groups. Villoro acknowledges the same complexity of good and evil in regard to scholasticism, the church, positivism, modernity, the project and ideals of the Mexican and U.S. revolutions, the civil rights movement, and so on.

To be clear, decolonialists are correct that liberalism has been used to mask oppression and white supremacy. They are also correct in their rejection of the idea that colonialism and oppression were a separate or just unfortunate side effect of modernity. The danger is slipping into claims about necessary relations or assuming that modernity or liberalism can never be anything but an ideological excuse to dominate, colonize, or oppress. This can be avoided by encouraging more rigorous, careful, and historically sensitive analysis of what particular aspects and assumptions (e.g., ontological, epistemological, and ethical ones) are problematic instead of just blanket statements or relying on some theoretical barometer of domination. This is what Villoro did. For instance, he was critical of the prioritization of the individual over the social in liberalism, how it denies the fundamental sociality of human beings, and assumes a hostile self/other relation that makes it easy to justify domination.45

### 1NR---AT: Can’t Solve Genocide

#### Capitalist exploitation is co-constitutive with the logic of indigenous erasure---only the collectivity of the alternative remediate the harms of colonialism

Balthaser 16 – Benjamin, associate professor of multi-ethnic US literature at Indiana University, South Bend, “Colonies and Capital”, Jacobin, 11/16/16, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/11/native-americans-marxism-colonialism-nodapl-archie-phinney-means-nez-perce> //JSL

Several theorists and activists have attempted to address the uneven history of the Left and Native American sovereignty in recent years. The widespread left support of the NoDAPL movement — including from America’s most famous socialist, Bernie Sanders — represents only the most obvious example. Historian and activist Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz has recovered the long legacy of the Latin American left’s engagement with indigenous issues through the work of Communist intellectual José Carlos Mariátegui. And David Harvey, as well as the Midnight Notes Collective, point to the ways in which “primary accumulation” — capitalism’s method for jump-starting growth by stealing and privatizing land and resources — is an ongoing and permanent feature of economic development. Still, most assume that Marxism and indigenous struggles have little to say to each other. The former theorizes capitalist modernity and historical transformation, taking the industrialized worker as its subject. Treaty claims and land rights are, at best, secondary concerns in this tradition. As a result, Churchill’s claim that indigenous people have historically been hostile to Marxian ideas generally goes unchallenged, especially in North America. Yet Churchill seems to ignore the writings of Native American Marxists themselves and their own engagement with the long history of dialectical materialist thought. This gap is not merely an ancillary concern: it furthers cultural assumptions that, in Philip Deloria’s words, Native Americans have “missed out on modernity.” Such assumptions also suggest that indigenous people and socialists have little common ground, furthering the notion that there is a dangerous and intractable rift between the labor-left and the sovereign rights of indigenous people. This is far from the truth. Anticapitalist and Anticolonial Archie Phinney, Nez Perce anthropologist and cofounder of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) — the longest-lived pan-Indian organization in the United States — remains one of most important, if least known, Native American intellectuals of the mid-twentieth century. Despite, or perhaps because of, his wide-ranging writings — which moved from analyses of the Soviet Union’s policies on indigenous Siberian tribes and articles on mode-of-production theory to books on Nez Perce oral traditions — his work has been eclipsed by other 1930s Native intellectuals, such as D’Arcy McNickle and John Joseph Mathews, who authored the first “modernist” Native American novels in the United States. Phinney’s work has not been fully collected or studied, at least in part due to the long shadow of McCarthyism in the academy: the most complete account of his life and work — a 2004 special issue of the Journal of Northwest Anthropology — spends a great deal of time trying to distance Phinney from his own socialist commitments. And while Phinney’s precise political allegiances remain unknown — for instance, whether he was a member of the Communist Party — it’s clear that, had he not died suddenly in the late 1940s, he would have been called before the House Un-American Activities Committee and likely fired from his position with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Pan-Indian, cosmopolitan, and self-reflexively modern, Phinney represents another strand of indigenous intellectual thought that avoids the stark binary Means and Churchill articulate. Phinney linked the fight for Native American sovereignty with other struggles for racial justice in the United States. He theorized that Native peoples exist both in- and outside American democratic structures, addressing what is unique to Native American politics while also acknowledging that indigenous populations are modern and must develop a political voice and political allies. Phinney emerged as an intellectual at a time when much of the colonial world saw the Soviet Union and global socialism as a means of liberation. As historians such as Mark Naison, Robin D.G. Kelley, and Penny von Eschen have suggested, the pluralist cultural and political movements of the 1930s intersected with anticolonial and black nationalist movements. They shared space in the same publications and often within the same organizations. As Naison and Kelley explain, after the decline of the Garvey movement in the late 1920s, the Communist Party (CPUSA) not only recruited former Garveyites, but in many ways took up the torch of black nationalism within the United States and much of the colonized world. Beginning with the Sixth Communist International (Comintern) Congress in 1928, the Communist Party put forth a set of policies that would dramatically shape intellectual and political currents in the United States for the next decade. Abandoning “pure” class critique, the Sixth Congress built on Lenin’s and Stalin’s writings and declared anticolonial struggle a legitimate part of global revolution. It announced that the Comintern would support the liberation struggles of both “national minorities” within states and of subjects of colonial powers. On the one hand, this policy followed — perhaps simplistically — the Soviet Union’s policy of self-determination within the former Russian empire. On the other hand, it opened the door for American party leaders to develop a self-determination thesis for the US Black Belt, declaring African Americans “internally colonized” subjects in need of their own state. Perhaps because of the Left’s greater attention to antiracism, there seem to have been a small number of Native American party members who had, at least in regional chapters, a relatively high profile. The West Coast CPUSA newspaper the Western Worker (later the Peoples’ Daily World) printed several headline stories about Native American activist Joe Manzanares in the 1930s; he also placed an advertisement asking for those “interested in Indian issues” to call a number at the San Francisco CPUSA office. In addition, several letters to the editor from Native Americans articulated why they joined the party, combining the demand for self-determination with communist class rhetoric and anticolonial interrogations of the savage-civilized binary. One letter, for instance, argued that “white bosses stole all the land from us Indians” and “they call us ‘natives,’ or ‘Indians,’ or ‘wild,’ . . . the Indians are not wild. . . . Indians are always friendly to workers who must slave for a living.” This writer suggests that entering modernity — being “not wild” — does not amount to assimilation. Socialism, described as “solidarity with the proletariat,” is reimagined as coincident with the writer’s claims to the land and his history of dispossession. A 1934 letter by Vincent Spotted Eagle theorizes Native American life through mode-of-production theory: Before the white man came, our mode of production and distribution were on a cooperative basis, without any exploitation. This is Communism, which is true Americanism. And this is why I joined the Communist Party. Spotted Eagle declares capitalism an “original product of Europe,” writing that “we have been exploited” ever since “Columbus discovered this Great Nation.” Playing on the trope of “Americanism,” Spotted Eagle claims nation status for his own “Great Nation” as well as citizenship rights within the United States. His answer to European capitalism is not to go back to pre-Colombian life, but rather to find a new synthesis with “lovers of all humanity, especially the Negroes” through a transnational socialist project he refers to as communism. At the same time, the Western Worker printed five stories about CPUSA members organizing relief drives and unemployment councils on reservations in California. In Montana, the party ran a Native American senatorial candidate by the name of Raymond Gray. This suggests that, at least in the West, party activists and Native Americans organized together. While the extent and shape of these drives remain unclear, that the Communist Party had an organizing presence on reservations paints a very different picture of both the party and Native groups’ political engagement. Further, the Western Worker ran numerous articles on illegal land claims, broken treaties, deportations of Native Americans to Mexico, and the “genocidal” policy of Indian Removal in California, suggesting that the party did not see Native Americans merely through the lens of class but understood the specificity of Native claims to injustice. This archival evidence belies Churchill’s and Means’s critiques of the relationship between Marxist praxis and indigenous struggle, in much the same way Phinney’s writings on the Soviet “national minorities” policy helped him develop his own materialist theories of indigenous sovereignty. While lacking in the formal party infrastructure that helped vocalize issues of importance to African Americans, such archival evidence suggest far greater participation and involvement between Native communities and the Marxist left than is usually granted. Assimilation as Proletarianization Phinney referred to the Soviet Union in a 1943 speech as “the first attempt of men to intelligently direct their own history.” This is not to suggest that he subscribed to Stalinist policy or was a card-carrying member of the Communist Party — indeed, as Michael Denning reminds us, focusing principally on party membership is not necessarily the best tool for analyzing radical movements of the 1930s. Yet Phinney, who studied under Franz Boas at Columbia and traveled to Leningrad with a letter of introduction from Marxist-feminist Agnes Smedley, clearly saw the Soviet Union and Marxism like many other intellectuals of color in his day: as an alternative mode of economic development that didn’t rely on the European West’s racial hierarchies. While earning his doctorate in Leningrad between 1932 and 1937, Phinney conducted a comparative study of US Indian policy and Soviet treatment of its national minorities, especially its Siberian hunting-and-gathering peoples. He hoped to find a model that the United States could emulate. While Phinney never published a book on this topic, a close reading of his published and unpublished manuscripts suggests that his exposure to Marxism and Soviet policy would powerfully influence his subsequent involvement with the implementation of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) and his career as a founding theoretician of postwar Indian activism. Phinney’s most widely circulated essay after his death, “Numipu Among the White Settlers,” was written as he corresponded with Boas during his stay in Leningrad. In laying out the contradictions faced by the Nimi’ipuu (or Numipu or Nez Perce), Phinney argued that the false binary between assimilation and a return to the past doesn’t help us understand the Nimi’ipuu after their surrender in 1877. Rather, he relied on mode-of-production theory to assess the tribe’s current status. As Phinney saw it, the Nimi’ipuu’s potential extinction could not be attributed to a single cause — and he made a point to highlight that they had survived their defeat at the hands of the military. Rather, the tribe’s “moribund” status resulted from a forty-year process by which “the Indians, having been lifted out of, or divested of, one culture,” were then “thrust into another one” — a foreign mode of life for which they had neither understanding nor the material resources with which to flourish. As a materialist — someone who believed that culture is embedded in and produced by the necessities of social and economic life — Phinney was skeptical of cultural revivalists who did not also provide a political program of economic liberation. He recounts the Nimi’ipuu’s collective mode of production as inseparable from their cultural identity: In the former communal economy, all activity was one continuous communal experience in which work (food quest and manufacture), ritual, and recreation were a single process. In subsistence production Indians had no conception of work as distinct from other cultural activity — there was not even a word for “labor” in their language. But with the abrupt transition from general collective participation to advanced capitalistic economy and individualism, they were confronted with a distinction between labor on an individualistic basis and their communal activity and recreation. This contradiction, fundamentally between collectivism and individualism, now disrupted the tribal order, because material benefits were offered to Numipu people individually, without the requirement of work. The individuality of the Indians was developed, but not in consequence of individual enterprise and effort; on the other hand, the communal spirit survived and is expressed today in the form of the aforementioned recreational activities. Phinney, believing that the Nimi’ipuu had lost control of their economic base, did not think “communal spirit” alone could overcome the tribe’s inability to produce its own livelihood. “The flashy regalia and vivid performance of Indians today satisfy both the white man’s taste for spectacular pageantry and the performer’s love for the spotlight,” Phinney wrote of Nimi’ipuu cultural celebrations, and yet “it must not be assumed that elements of Indian culture are being revived. On the contrary, this represents the last stage in the degradation of Numipu culture.” Phinney was no cultural purist, but he felt that cultural celebration without a political or economic program did not signal a revival. Rather, it indexed the tribe’s assimilation into the racial politics of consumer spectacle. There could be no cultural solution without an economic one. Phinney never argued that the Nimi’ipuu should assimilate their lives and work patterns to the settler-colonial economy. He never suggested — as so many others did — that they rely on job training, farming techniques, or educational opportunities provided by the white social order. Instead, he examined what kind of social order the Nimi’ipuu were being asked to join, arguing that participating in the capitalist economy as workers would merely mean “assimilation on the lowest level of white proletarian existence.” Leaving the reservation and joining the working class would achieve “a condition wherein [the Nimi’ipuu] must face the adversities of exploitation and class antagonism,” trading the communal struggle against settler-colonialism for the individual struggle for bare survival. Phinney believed this would, more likely than not, make them worse off than they had been on their allotments and food rations. Framing assimilation as “proletarianization,” Phinney underscores that sovereignty includes not only control over land, but one’s own labor as well. As he explained, for most workers, their conscription into capitalism begins with destitution: There are today in the United States more Negro and more white citizens than Indians who are existing under inhuman conditions of misery and poverty; these non-Indians receive no special attention because they are unemployed proletarians and impoverished tenants and farmers — i.e., active components of capitalist society who are supposed to work out their own salvations individually — to live or die by their own efforts . . . Phinney added, with characteristic acerbity, that “the US government feels compelled to rehabilitate [the Nimi’ipuu]” and bring them “up to the level equal to that of the average rural white family.” But that “average rural white family” itself needed a strong dose of “rehabilitation.” In this passage, Phinney undermines the binary between “primitive” and “modern,” asking why a Native American would want to be assimilated into a social order that itself was fissured along race and class lines. The Nimi’ipuu have already had modernity thrust upon them — the real question is, what kind? Rather than join the working class, Phinney called for Native peoples to fuse their tradition of communal ownership and tribal identity with the first principles of Marxist economics — “ownership of the means of production.” Native Americans, he suggested, should “make Indian groups economically self-supporting on the basis of cooperative (tribal) organization and corporate (common) ownership of the means of production.” In this way, Phinney adapted Marx to an indigenous framework, suggesting that only a collective economic base could support tribal culture. Rather than calling for self-supporting indigenous communities separate from industrialized society, Phinney envisioned collective economic self-sufficiency “break[ing] down the barriers of isolation” and allowing the Nimi’ipuu to align themselves with the mass of “average rural white families” in working toward “new and better conditions of life” as “alert, modern communities.” Phinney’s modernism emerged from his sense that life must be oriented toward social transformation. To try to revive the past, Phinney remarked, would be to live a “‘reservation’ existence of befeathered museum specimens” — to become the “vanishing Indian” whose outmoded ways retroactively justify the theft of Nez Perce land. Yet he also realized that progress and modernity came at an existential price. For Native Americans, confronting the future also meant confronting the profound experience of loss, even of destitution, that resulted from centuries of disease and dispossession followed by colonial rule. Modernity, as he saw it, was therefore an unfinished project, the outcome of which would depend on social struggle. A New Indian Intelligentsia Phinney sought work with the BIA when the agency was undergoing a profound transition. The 1934 IRA or “Indian New Deal” not only decriminalized indigenous culture and ended the government’s disastrous assimilation policies, it also created the first affirmative action program in federal hiring, recruiting large numbers of educated Native Americans into its administrative ranks. Yet Phinney had his own vision of Indian self-empowerment, which expressed a greater skepticism of the American state than his subsequent decision to work for the government would suggest. Sending a long and critical letter to BIA leader John Collier, Phinney correctly reflected that the IRA “failed to break out of the rigid guardianship of the government” and fell dangerously short of the forms of sovereignty he outlined in his “Numipu” essay. Objecting to the dominance of white anthropologists and missionaries at the American Indian Conference in 1939, Phinney formed a new caucus “limited to bona fide Indian leaders,” independent of Collier’s BIA. This group became the National Congress of American Indians. A reading of Phinney’s published and unpublished writings reveals that he felt this pan-Indian organization could empower Native Americans to express a modern sense of self and have a political impact on the United States. In an essay entitled “A New Indian Intelligentsia,” Phinney sketched out his vision of the NCAI. He began by calling on American Indians to radically transform their concept of their own identity: Apart from any considerations of racism or nationalism, there must be ascribed to American Indians not only a tribal status but a racial status. The concept of an Indian “race” derives largely from our modern propensity for classifying groups of people rather than individualizing them. Anciently, Indians identified themselves by local groups or bands, later by tribes and ethnolinguistic stocks, until now they have gained a distinct consciousness of that all-embracing classification — “Indians.” . . . This trend is already apparent among Indian tribes as it is among other minorities throughout the world. Ever the dialectician, Phinney theorized that the imposed identity of race, like the imposed identity of the worker under capitalism, could serve as the basis for collective strength. Concerned that tribal identity could prevent Native peoples from developing wider alliances, Phinney stressed that “Indian racial heritage is not a thing that depends for its survival upon a reservation atmosphere. [S]uch nonreservation Indians are probably the most capable and aggressive element of the Indian population in the United States.” Phinney’s last point seems telling. Rather than imagine, as Means does, that Native Americans who live in cities would be less politically conscious than those on reservations, Phinney argues that diasporic Native peoples are in fact the most politically active. The NCAI, he believed, would function as the vanguard of this new, pan-Indian community. It would be far more “aggressive and militant” than earlier Indian organizations precisely because it acknowledged the modernity of the Native American condition. Phinney’s turn toward racial affiliation did not mark a turn toward assimilation. The NCAI limited its involvement with white-led organizations, and its own membership was restricted solely to Native Americans. Indeed, the NCAI was so suspicious of white authority that any Indian working for the BIA could not assume a leadership position. At its foundation, the NCAI ranked self-determination and sovereignty as its primary political concerns. The group would advance Indian interests at the national level, articulating a broadly Native point of view separate from tribal and land-based identities yet inextricably interwoven with local concerns. The NCAI’s founders understood that their interests coincided with those of other people of color, yet they also saw Indian identity as a distinct form of belonging, emerging from history, treaty claims, and legal relationships with the federal government. In other words, the NCAI, thanks to Phinney’s visionary construction, used modern racial formations to function politically, yet it retained a sovereign Indian identity and purpose. As the NCAI’s heroic struggle to end the disastrous “termination policy” a decade later would suggest, Phinney’s vision for a pan-Indian Congress came not a moment too late. “All The Real Indians Died Off” Phinney’s life and work open up a set of questions about identity and praxis that still have purchase on the national imaginary about Native Americans. As Dunbar-Ortiz recently articulated, the most persistent myth about indigenous Americans is that they have vanished, part of a premodern past that has inevitably, if tragically, come and gone. The notion that “Indians have missed out on modernity” has justified their erasure from history and the logic for their conquest. The little attention paid to Phinney only reinforces this. Historians have tended to present him as either an Indian activist, uninterested in socialism, or as a “white man’s Indian” who adopted European ideas unsuited for Native life. But he was much more like other intellectuals of color of his day — concerned with colonialism, racial identity, and self-determination for his people in a global context. His belief that Native issues should matter to the Left and that Marxism has a role to play in indigenous liberation does not make Phinney a lone iconoclast — rather, it places his work in a global context that understands indigeneity, land, imperialism, and modernity as part of a coherent historical conjuncture. Phinney’s work suggests that modernity and Native American life need to be theorized together, and his ideas about what modern life may represent for all subaltern groups bears greater scrutiny. The questions he posed to the Nimi’ipuu apply to many groups that find themselves alienated, dispossessed, and exploited by capitalism: how to move forward as “alert, modern communities” that are “able to govern their affairs”? Equally, how do we transform the categories capitalism imposes upon us into modes of collective self-consciousness? Phinney understood that capitalism has a global, totalizing logic. But he also realized that this does not mean all subjects’ oppression — or liberation — is configured in the same way. He anticipated the largest, hemispheric pan-tribal gathering in many decades at the NoDAPL camp, and also saw that the fight to save the Standing Rock Sioux’s land, water, and treaty claims participate in a larger struggle over intensified resource extraction, primary accumulation, toxic racism, and the police state. Framing themselves as “water defenders,” the Standing Rock Sioux tribe both dramatizes the violation of their sovereign rights as a nation over their own resources, and connects them to a global struggle to wrest the foundational requirements of life, water, soil, and air from the grips of capital. In much the same way Phinney writes about race, such a construction highlights what is specific to indigenous struggle, while at the same time connecting that struggle to a transnational call for ecological justice. Fighting for indigenous sovereignty does not distract from transforming capitalist modernity — it is central to it.

## Adv

### 1NR---AT: Calculative Thought Bad

#### Empiricism can be emancipatory.

Jakubek and Wood, 18—Kansas State University (Joseph and Spencer, “Emancipatory Empiricism: The Rural Sociology of W.E.B. Du Bois,” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, 2018, Vol. 4(1), 14–34, dml)

Du Bois’ understanding of the links between empirical research and social policy is a direct development of his academic training (Barkin 2000; Broderick 1958; Du Bois 1968; Morris 2015; Outlaw 2000; Rudwick 1969; Wortham 2009). Du Bois earned two bachelor’s degrees from Fisk University and Harvard University before continuing graduate education at Harvard and the University of Berlin. At Harvard, he completed courses in history, philosophy, and economics and studied under influential and prominent scholars, including William James and George Santayana, among others (Morris 2015). In Berlin, his primary mentor was Gustav Schmoller, but Du Bois was also influenced by other notable faculty members, including Adolph Wagner, Heinrich von Treitschke, Max Lenz, and August Meitzen (Broderick 1958; Du Bois 1968; Wortham 2009). Schmoller and Meitzen both shaped Du Bois’ approach to empiricism and instilled a sense of the importance of empirical research for informing equitable policy.

While his training in Berlin provided the foundation for his empirical agenda, his time at Harvard with James and Santayana also influenced his emancipatory empiricism. James’s concept of a radical empiricism emphasizes values, social meanings, and intentionality in influencing social experience, academic observations, and empirical measurements (James [1912] 2008). Social science empiricism, for James, was inevitably shaped by the interpretations of social action by observers (James [1912] 2008). Measurements of social phenomena are therefore shaped by both their contents and their context, something that Du Bois insightfully connected to the lived experiences of racial inequality. Santayana’s influence can be seen in the modernist orientation of Du Bois’ work and his turn away from Victorian ideals and conceptions of social class and culture. Santayana was noted at the time for asking questions about the nature of man and society that opposed Victorian institutions and “puritanism” in intellectual discourse (Singal 1982:4). Many of these same tensions are echoed in Du Bois’ sociological work.

Du Bois’ exposure to the ideas of his mentors very likely aligned with his unique experiences of being an educated Black man. Du Bois’ empiricism was, by its very nature, a radical and modernist empiricism as it was constructed from a primarily marginalized position, and it was largely aimed at clarifying the experience of marginalization itself. His empiricism was focused on combatting inaccurate and often racist depictions of African Americans that frequently found a home in the grand theory of academic thought. When he returned to the United States in 1896, Du Bois noted that much social policy surrounding racial inequality needed revision (Du Bois 1997). Consequently, he directed his first sociological inquiries toward the pursuit of social justice and more equitable social policy surrounding race (Du Bois 1968; Williams 2006; Wright and Calhoun 2006).

American Sociology, Social Darwinism, and Racial Emancipation

Embodying Marable’s Black intellectual tradition, Du Bois understood the social construction of racial categories by linking his academic training and lived experiences as a Black man (Du Bois 1968; Marable 1986, 2013; Morris 2015; Rabaka 2010; Williams 2006; Zuckerman 2004). Marable (1986) described this tradition as a link between the lived experiences of African American scholars and the foci and goals of their research. The emancipatory empiricism of Du Bois’ sociology truly champions this framework. Raised in New England and living in the American South both before and after he lived in Germany, Du Bois’ varying experiences of racial inequality directed his research toward the link between race and social development (Du Bois 1968; Williams 2006; Zuckerman 2004). Du Bois traveled extensively throughout Europe while living in Germany and described various social interactions as unencumbered by the weight of racial discrimination and prejudice he experienced in America (Du Bois 1968:160). Differences among his experiences in different regions of the United States and abroad helped Du Bois conceptualize racial categories as social constructions that are historically embedded within certain social institutions (Du Bois 1968; Lewis 2000).

Du Bois’ emancipatory empiricism provided the professional justification to reject social Darwinism within academic thought. This also led him to critique tendencies within American sociology toward grand theories of social stratification that reified the social order (Du Bois [1904] 1978). Pushing instead for empirical methods and objective participant observation, Du Bois desired an accurate understanding of inequality that was far from the “prejudiced eyes” of racialized grand theory (Du Bois [1904–1905] 2000; Du Bois 1997:75; Rabaka 2010; Wright and Calhoun 2006). Du Bois wrote about the connections between his training and his desire for an emancipatory empiricism, “Above all I began to understand the real meaning of scientific research and the dim outline of methods of employing its technique and its results in the new social sciences for the settlement of the Negro problem in America” (Du Bois 1968:160). Inductive methods were also critically important for combatting the prevailing stereotypes found within American academic discourse as Du Bois set out “to study the facts, any and all facts, concerning the American Negro and his plight, and by measurement and comparison and research, work up to any valid generalization which I could” (Du Bois [1940] 2007:26).

Eager to establish an American sociology which would more accurately describe and theorize racial relations, Du Bois focused his empirical attention on Black communities and their social development (Rabaka 2010; Wright 2002c; Wright and Calhoun 2006). Already teaching at both Wilberforce University and the University of Pennsylvania after returning to the United States, Du Bois accepted an invitation from Atlanta University’s president, Horace Bumstead, for a professorship in history and economics in 1897 (Horne 2009; Lewis 2000; Wright 2002a). Atlanta University was just starting its research series, the Conference on Negro Problems, in which Du Bois directed 16 studies between 1897 and 1914 (Wright 2002a). While a faculty member at Atlanta University, Du Bois forged the first department of sociology in the country and spearheaded much of the groundbreaking work conducted by the Atlanta Sociological Laboratory from 1896 to 1917 (Wright 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). Importantly, it was during the early years of this period that Du Bois completed his most rigorous rural studies discussed later in this article. Recent research has shed new light on the work of Du Bois and other scholars associated with the Atlanta Sociological Laboratory as pioneering in several areas, notably the sociology of the South and regionalism (Wright 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2009, 2016). We complement this expanded application of Du Bois’ work by suggesting that some of these early studies also serve as pioneering works for the field of rural sociology.

Du Bois’ Emancipatory Rural Sociology

Du Bois’ rural interests were evident while still a student in Berlin, where he conducted multiple political-economic analyses of American agrarian production. Most notably, he conducted a dissertationlevel analysis written in 1893 focused on of the production differences between small and large farms in the American south. This study, “The Plantation and Peasant Proprietorship System of Agriculture in the Southern United States,” was an in-depth statistical inquiry of farm tenure, size, and production rates in which Du Bois challenged popular theoretical assumptions within Western economics about larger farms’ being more efficient and productive (Du Bois 1968, [1899] 1973; Rudwick 1974). As a professional sociologist, many of Du Bois’ earliest empirical investigations took place in the American rural South, and it was there where he first used his methodological training to describe the social and economic conditions of rural Black communities (Lewis 1993; Rabaka 2010; Wright 2014). Rural spaces offered a unique setting to observe the social and economic progress of Black communities in the years after the Civil War. The turn of the twentieth century was a time of great social change, and Du Bois knew the potential for social development that would accompany many of those changes. Recognizing this, he consciously focused his empirical research on the opportunities for progress that faced rural populations in the modernizing American South.

Du Bois’ most elaborate investigations of rural spaces were funded by the U.S. Department of Labor, known then as the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In 1897, Du Bois requested funding from the commissioner of the bureau, Carroll Wright, to complete a two-tiered research plan to systematically determine the communal and economic progress of southern rural Black communities (Du Bois 1968:202). In the first tier, Du Bois would conduct several community case studies, collecting data on various topics such as geographic density of population, occupations, wages, home ownership, health and longevity, morals and manners, crime and law, labor opportunities, religion, education, literature, and art. This first set of studies would “locate and define difficulties” in sociological investigation of rural communities and “indicate lines upon which a larger investigation could be carried to success” (Du Bois 1997:41). The second tier consisted of larger regional and national studies and used census and archival data to develop more generalizable information. It was through the combination of local community studies and aggregate regional data that Du Bois wished to formulate a truly accurate depiction of Black communities in the American South (Morris 2015; Rabaka 2010). His methodological toolkit included household surveys, semistructured interviews, participant observation, ethnographic data collection, archival and census research, and statistical analysis (Morris 2015).

Such rigorous methods were required if objective and accurate scientific activity were to lead to the benefit of Black communities and the emancipation and growth of Black individuals (Du Bois 1968). Importantly, Du Bois noted in his request to Wright that these preliminary studies would provide a framework for a research agenda building off subsequent findings that would likely challenge racist and stereotypical images of Black people. The results from the Department of Labor studies “could be published and would by allaying false notions and prejudices prepare the public mind for the larger work” that would follow (Du Bois 1997:41). Du Bois received funding to conduct five studies for the Department of Labor lasting from 1898 to 1905. The five commissioned studies are “The Negroes of Farmville, Virginia: A Social Study” (Du Bois 1898), “The Negro in the Black Belt: Some Social Sketches” (Du Bois 1899), “The Negro Landholder in Georgia” (Du Bois 1901b), “The Negro Farmer” (Du Bois 1904b), and “The Sharecropping System in Lowndes County, Alabama.” Importantly, “The Sharecropping System in Lowndes County, Alabama” was censored by the Department of Labor and never published, because, Du Bois believed, it was too critical of the social sources of rural poverty and social inequality in its findings (Aptheker 1980; Rabaka 2010). These studies represent the pinnacle of Du Bois’ rural sociology but are not exhaustive of his emancipatory interests in rural spaces and agrarian production. He also conducted other less empirical studies and wrote quite poetically about rural spaces in The Souls of Black Folk (Du Bois [1903] 1989) and other work.1 We emphasize the studies funded by the Department of Labor as representing his pioneering work that still resonates with research in the broad field of rural sociology. The Department of Labor studies align with the historical emphasis on community and the structure of agriculture within rural sociology.